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INTRODUCTION
Part I. "Unverb~lized Awareness as an Agency for Transfer of Learning" was prepared m advance_forparticipants in a symposium sponsored
by the Wenner-Gren Foundat10n for Anthropological Research and held
at !he castle, Burg ,Wartenstein, near Glognitz, Austria, July 17~25,1968.
This paper was wr~tten ~or an inte:disciplinary group, and it presents as
clearly as I can m prmt, the kmds of learning behavior and commtJ?ication behavior for which the next two papers are an attempted
rationale.
Part II. "f\necd~tal Reports of Incidents which Gave Rise to
Hypotheses" is _restricted to descriptions of equine behavior, one way to
pr~vent con~usion between non_verb~lactivity and linguistic processes.
This paper, like the nex~,was wr~tten m 1963 as an appendix to a proposal
for r~searc~ to be car:ied out m Urbana, Illinois, and Durham, North
Car_olma,with the writer as principal investigator. Although the joint
proJec~was never funded, ethologists familiar with the proposed undertakmg have urged that these anecdotal reports be published, so that
others around the world can study and try to interpret them.
Part III. "Semantical Referents for Logical Constants- A Genetic Theory
of the Nature of Language"
In 1947 at the University of Chicago, Charles Morris, author of Signs,
Langu~ge a~d Behavior (Prentice Hall, New York, 1946) urged Gertrude
Hendi:ixto 'be on the look-out" for anything that could be interpreted as
behav10ralcounterparts to the logical connectives in language. Dr. Morris
felt the nature of l?gical c?nnectives (formators) to be one of the great
unsolved problems m the field. A prevailing philosophical view has been
that _thelogical connectives of language have no content, refer to nothing.
I believe that they :efer to ?lasses of awarenesses, or sets of ordered pairs
of awarenesses. This paper is an attempt to clarify that view. Perhaps the
5

greatest argument in its favor is the extent to which m~ny ~er~tofore
seemingly unrelated phenomena suddenly "fit together." I~s a
like :e
theory of plate tectonics in geology. "It is a wondrous thmgf
a~ 1e
random facts in one's head suddenly fall into the slots o an ° er Y
framework."*
For a reader who has never entertained the premise that thder~.are\~ 0
subverbal processes analogous to formal induction and de uc ion, .e
exercise is painfully difficult at first. But let us have the ~ourage t~ tfY ~t
and see where it leads. It helps to remember that w~e;°"Riemann, o yai,
and Lobachevski each separately tried to prove Euclid s parallel po~tu~ate
by assuming the postulate to be false and trying to derive a contradiction,
instead in each case a whole new geometry emerged: the great ~onEuclidean geometries now casting light on the nature of astronomical
space.

!t

PARTI
Unverbalized Awareness
as an Agency for Transfer
of Learning

*John McPhee quoting Kenneth Deffeyes in "Annals of the Former
World: Basin and Range-II." The New Yorker, October 27, 1980, p. 146.
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Introduction
As recently as three decades ago, prominent educational psychologists
were maintaining that there was no such thing as transfer of learning to
problems which arose in a context different from that of the original
learning situation. The conclusion had been drawn a priori from the
hypothesis that learning consisted of the formation of physical connections in neural tissue. Hence, finding an appropriate response to a new
kindof stimulus was restricted to trial-and-error procedures.
Admittedly, one could solve new problems by deductive application of
generalities already learned; such problems could be either to predict
outcomes or to explain things which had already happened. Furthermore,
it was agreed that one could also acquire a generalization new to himself
all by himself by collecting and classifying data, and then formulating
descriptions of relations or patterns which appeared among the data.
Most, if not all, of such intellectual activity was thought to be mediated
through linguistic formulation. Deduction and induction were, in fact,
defined to be linguistic processes, deduction a matter of manipulating
language according to rules of inference, induction a matter of composing
descriptions of patterns. The dynamic, creative step of noticing a pattern
in the first place, or the solution to a problem seen suddenly and acted
upon-these processes were relegated to something mysterious but nice
UnverbalizedAwareness 7

called 'insight'. 1 According to prevailing theories of instructi~n, there was
little a teacher could do to promote insight beyond presenting st\ldents
with problems. The insight itself was thought to depend upo~ ~n i~1:ate
ability present in some learners but left out of others by an inJudic10us
choice of grandparents.
Enn those teachers, and teachers of teachers. who espoused Charles
Hubbard Judd's theory that conscious generalization [as ~ontrasted with
generalizations obtained by interpretation of sentences wntten or uttered
by others] was the agency of transfer of learning-even those people
considered the process of conscious generalization to be synonymo~s with
composing a sentence which expresses a relation or pat~ern noti~eable
among data. Nevertheless, to a teacher of mathematics or science,
learning by conscious generalization has always seemed a_1:1-uchbet~er
preparation for dynamic problem solving th~n ?ther prevailing t?eones
based on memorizing other people's generahzat10ns. and then using the
statements as recipes for working lots and lots of examples.
. .
It was while I was pursuing skill in the inductive metho~. that ts, _m
teaching for conscious generalization, that the inci_dentswhich gave nse
to the unverbalized awareness theory occurred. Thirty years of atte~pts
to communicate with professional educators abou~ u_nverbahzed
awareness have made me very skeptical about proceeding in any way
other than through examples. I beg the indulgenc~ of my fellow participants in this Conference as I attempt to recount this development.
The Breakthrough
One person pursuing an improbable combination of interests and endeavors was probably necessary for somet~ing as ~ubtle ~nd as prev~lent
as the unverbalized counterparts of deduct10n and induct10n to be noticed.
The thing seems to have been lying right out into the open waiting for me. ·
I was a young teacher who had just completed a book called Plane
2
Geometry and Its Reasoning in collaboration with Harry .C.. Ba~b_er.
There had been much study and conferring on the roles of logic, mtu1t10n,
and scientific method in the learning of this new approach to second~
school geometry, and many of the questions which had arisen were still
unanswered.

In the spring of 1937 I was purs~ing at least three endea~ors,vigorously
and intently-and more or less simultaneously. (1) At _six o cl?ck each
morning I was schooling a difficult horse, a handsome a~1mal which_Ihad
been trying to re-train since November 1935 and which I had fu~ally
purchased in March 1936. (2) My firs~ class of the school da~ was a_nm_th
grade algebra class, where I was trymg to demonstrate an mductive mstructional approach to observers in a teachers college laboratory school.
(3) A third pursuit was a non-credit seminar _i~ which ~ine student
teachers and I as their supervisor were exammmg the literature on
transfer of training.
8 Unverbalized Awareness

The college seniors in the seminar were striving for an inductive aproach in all of their lesson planning, an approach in which examples
~receded statement of a principle or telling the name of a concept. There
were some bright, searching minds in this group of young people, and
they asked good questions. In connection with Judd's conscious
generalization theory of transfer, someone wondered aloud whether there
was such a thing as non-conscious generalizing, or unconscious
generalizing, or subconscious generalizing. It was pointed out that the
only process which Judd contrasted with his conscious generalization
example was the process in which t~acher or textbook state? the
generalization to be learned; examples, if any, came later. According to
Judd 3 a learner experienced conscious generalization when he himself
comp~sed the sentence which stated the generalization, and he did this
from having noticed some similarity among examples presented to him.
The existence of a non-conscious (or unconscious, or subconscious) state of
mind corresponding to, or preceding, verbal formulation-this question
was neither discussed nor raised in the literature which the seminar group
examined. Nevertheless, the question continued to recur to the teacher,
and one such recurrence was on a Saturday morning in May at a crucial
moment in the horse-training venture referred to above.12
This horse had been bred and trained for the show ring, and had done
pretty well as a junior five-gaited horse in his four-year-old form. The
following year he had become unreliable in the ring. He had been sold at
auction in November 1935 to the riding academy owner from whom I
boug-ht the horse. Although the horse had excellent stable manners, he
was unsafe for most riders. He would become excited under the saddle,
trotting faster and faster until he broke over into a gallop. From such a
moment on, he was a frantic runaway. I rode the horse frequently on an
indoor track during the four months preceding my purchase. During the
first year that I owned him, I succeeded in teaching him to walk on
command and to hold the trot on the indoor track without breaking to a
run. But I did not succeed in teaching him to canter with poise. It was the
first hot-blooded, high-bred horse I had ever tried to re-train, and I soon
learned that tiring the horse was no solution. If allowed to do so, he would
have worked until he dropped dead. I did not dare to enter him in the local
horse show in August 1936; I felt sure that when it came time to canter, I
would never get him turned in the ring; he would have disappeared into
the dark at one end of the ring, and no one in the grandstand would have
seen him again until he had circled the half-mile race track and popped
into the lighted ring from the opposite direction at the other end!
As soon as the frost was out of the ground in March 1937, I tried a new
approach. It seemed to me that if I could make sure that whenever the
horse did canter, it was at a slow speed and on light rein pressure, then
after enough consecutive examples without exception, he would come to
associate relaxation, slow speed, and a light mouth with the foot-order
and rhythm which make up the gait called 'canter'. At the close of each
Unverbalized Awareness 9

workout under the saddle on the indoor track, I took the horse to a small,
enclosed, outdoor ring. I dismounted and attached a longe rein to one ring
cf the snaffle bit and, signaling the horse with voice and long whip,
taught him to canter in a very small circle-the circle so small that he
could not go fast. A brief cantering lesson of this kind on each lead was
the final part of each day's workout.
After the first few weeks, I began to remain in the saddle for this part
of the day's schooling. At first I would occasionally feel the impulse to
plunge and to try to run come over the horse, but in so small a ring he
could do nothing about it, and he always regained his poise before any
trouble developed. His canter became high and airy-almost a dressage
canter.
By the first week in May, I decided it might be safe to test the new
learning. I planned a six-mile ride on country roads, along the second and
third miles of which there were four level stretches with a steep hill at the
far end of each stretch. I planned to canter along the level stretch and to
bring the horse back to a walk on the incline, trusting the hill to help me
to get him under control if he lost his head, clamped his teeth on the bit,
and tried to run. I was also depending upon the fact that the animal would
be headed away from home at the time.
The first stretch of canter was negotiated with complete success. The
second was equally successful. Intervals of walk, then trot, then walk
were inserted between each two places to canter. Everything went perfectly until we walked around a curve where the third level stretch with a
steep hill beyond came in sight. Suddenly, my nice, quiet, well-poised
horse began to snort and dance. He put himself in position for the canter
signal which he had been taught, a signal from which the horse lifts into a
collected canter from a halt, and he was so bursting with excitement and
eagerness to do it that I knew that I did not dare to let him try it. Excited
as he was, he would have lost his head and would have tried to run-and
all that I had accomplished in two months of "conditioning" would have
been lost.
But my load of discouragement and defeat was pierced by a shaft of
wonder. What kind of thing was this new learning about appropriate
places to canter? And so on that morning ride in May, heartsick with the
failure of the long, tedious sequence of horse-training lessons, even as I
faced with dread the more than three miles of struggle ahead of me to
keep my nervous horse from "running away" home (that is, the three miles
of holding him to the speed of a walk as he pranced along in a rough, slow
trot), I became excited at the thought of what had happened. Had not the
horse generalized from the sameness in the first two examples? If verbalized, what the horse had discerned would be something like this:
When we come to a level stretch of road with a hill at the far end of
it, then I am permitted to canter.
In the canter the feet come down in the same order as in the gallop. To a
powerful, healthy, highly-animated, hot-blooded horse on a cool May
10 Unverbalized Awareness

morning, the desire to run must have been very strong. It seemed to rr:.e
that with this kind of motivation the horse had generalized by the time he
came to the third appropriate stretch of road. The highly motivated
generalizing had cu_tthrough _a~d taken precedence over eight weeks of
careful but unmotivated trammg based on the conditioned learning
hypothesis.
In the ensui~g ~eeks I cha~ged all my trai:1ing tactics to conform to my
new hypothetical m~erpretat10n ?f the learnmg I was trying to promote. I
thought of each thmg that I wished the horse to learn as a universal
generalization, a universal if-then, if you please. I was careful to preserve
a consistent temporal sequence for "if" and "then" events. The horse
would reveal by his behavior the instant he became aware of the relati~n
between an "if' set of events and the related "then" set of events. The
horse would produce a member of the "if" set in order to obtain an event
of the "then" set when the "then" events were desirable to him· and he
would refrain f~om ~n habitu_al "if" event ~o avoid the ensuin~ "then"
event when the_ then set_cons1stedof undesirable outcomes. It seemed to
me. that the ~irs! such ~nstance was always accompanied by a halfhesitant, quest10nmg motion; and !he immediate acceptance and approval
on my part seemed to produce a npple of something like satisfaction or
even elation, in the horse.
'
The hors~ progr~sse? rapidly ~n his training from that morning on. He
became dehg~tful to ~1de'.1-nddnve, dependable to show, a suitable mount
for advanced mstruc~10n 1:1equitation, and a good mount for a trail ride.
The summer I took him ~1th me to Roxbury, Vermont, he was one of the
most_dependa?le_horses 1~ the Teela-Wooket Drill Troup. A twelve-yearold gu l :ode him m the dnll. And on three later occasions back in Illinois I
rod~ th~s horse as o_ne of the two marshals for the Eastern Illinois
~mvers1ty ~omecommg Parade at Charleston, with the marching band
directly behmd_us. The hor~,epara~ed as though his heart would burst; his
mouth stayed hght; and he kept his head" every step of the way.
I am_sure that to a casu_alobserver, many of the things done during the
schooh~g-ses~10nsfollowmg that Saturday morning ride would not have
been distmgmsh_able from _t~in~sdone in the earlier sessions which had
been planned with ~ condit10nmg hypothesis in mind. Just how doing
a~most the same t~mgs but_ for different reasons could produce such
d1f!ere?t outcom~s is a quEsbon worthy of contemplation. Certainly, the
tramer ~ r_egardmg each new thing learned as awareness of a
~enerahza~10n,elevated the equine learner to a position of higher respect
m ~he tramer s regard. There was a kind of pervasive dignity between
tra~ner and horse which had not been there before, a kind of empathy
whic~ generated a greater respect in trainer for horse, and, very soon, a
seemmgly greater respect of horse for trainer.

Unverbalized Awareness 11

But let us now go back to what was happening -~ that n~th-grade
algebra class. At that time in May, equations contammg fract10ns were
the problems of the day. More than half of t~e class c~m_ld
not tell ~hat
multiplier to use to obtain an equivalent equation contammg no fractio~s.
At sometime in their elementary school careers surely they had studied
1
t common multiple, but application of that concept to the ~ew
s1~:~ion simply did not occur to them. "No transfer," let us say. The first
exercise was something like:

2x+~=2
3 5
After several inappropriate multipliers had been suggested, I began to
improvise examples from which the pattern of the needed generalization
could emerge. Each student was to write his answer on a piece of paper
that could be seen by the teacher walking about the room.
"What is the smallest multiplier for 2x which will yield a product that is
not
3
a fraction?" Several of the answers were wrong.
"Will multiplying by 2 accomplish this?" Students carried out the
multiplication, obtained '4x' and answered, "No."

3

Will multiplying by 3 give us a result that is not a fraction?" Result, 6x
divided by 3, which is 2x. Answer, "Yes."
''What is the next smallest multiplier that will accomplish our -purpose?" Several gave wrong answers.
''Will multiplying by 4 do it?" Students obtaining 8xanswered, "No."

3
''Will multiplying by 5 work?''Result,lOx; answer "No."
3
"How about multiplying by 6?" Result, l 2x, or 4x. "Yes!"

3

Some who had not known about six were now ready to predict that 9
would work, but some members of the class still needed to multiply by 7,
by 8, and by 9 before they jumped to predicting, "12, 15, 18, 21, 24," etc.
The fraction, 'x', was treated with similar series of questions. As the

3

multipliers which "worked" for each example were identified, they were
listed on the chalk board. When I then asked:
''What is the smallest multiplier which appears in both lists?" The
students quickly found 15.
Another more difficult example given the same treatment:

lists of multiples: 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42 ... ; 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 ... ;
15,30,45,60,75,90....
.
.
At the third example, almost every student m the class predicted ~he
best multiplier to use as soon as he read the problem. In the last five
minutes of the hour, the clas~ r~ced th:ough the rest of th~ P~?blems in
the list, predicting the multiplier which would most easily clear the
equation of fractions" almost as fast as th~y could read. The n~xt day's
lesson was assigned, and the class was permitted to start work on it.
It was only after the dismissal bell for that class hour had rung, and the
usual conference with my obser_vez:;was under way, ~hat I realized that I
had omitted calling for a verbahzat10n of the newly-chscovered rule. I had
instead enthusiastically accepted behavioral evidence of awarenessof the
rule, just as if I had been working with the ?orse! On m?re _careful
analysis, it seemed to us that more than one pertment generahzat1on had
emerged from the algebra lesson. For some members of the class, the
concepts of multiple of a number and common multiple of two or more
numbers had probably also come clear for the first time. However, none of
these things had been mentioned. I apologized to my observers for having
omitted what was probably the most important step in the inductive
lesson, and promised to finish the job the next day.
At the next meeting of that algebra class it was evident that the class
had been quite successful with the problems assigned. The students were
tested with some more new examples before I called for statement of the
rule for clearing an equation of fractions. The classroom atmosphere
immediately changed from one of animated success to an atmosphere of
laborious effort. It turned out that the terms 'multiple' and 'common
multiple' were not in the producing vocabulary of many members of the
class. Stating a rule without names for these concepts made the task
awkward and lengthy. By the time a sentence acceptable to the teacher
(i.e., to me) had been achieved, all the excitement of learning was gone,
and nobody wanted to work that kind of problem any more. Although the
student teachers and I discussed this effect in our next seminar meeting,
it still did not occur to any of us that verbalizing the discovery might not
add anything to the learner's power to apply the discovery in the solving
of new problems. We still took for granted that verbalizing the discovery
was a necessary part of the learning for maximum transfer power.
However, we did know that we had stumbled upon something that had
not been mentioned in the literature we had been studying; namely, that
it is possible to plan an inductive lesson so that the stage is set for a
learner to apply the generalization to a new problem the moment he
becomes aware of the generalization. If a student who had to experiment
to find out what to use for the best multiplier on the equation:

5a+ 3a= 34
6 10 15
This time by similar tactics they found the smallest multiplier in all three
12 Unverbalized Awareness
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5a + 3a = 34
6 10 15
next encounters:

3x + 5x = 3
4 10
and immediately proposes 20 for the multiplier, he has becon_ieaware of a
shortcut which he did not have before he worked the precedmg example.
His application behavior is evidence that he possesses unverbalized
awareness of the following universal generalization:
The most economical way to clear an equation of fractions is to
multiply each side by the lowest common multiple of the
denominators.
What I thought I had acquired was a procedure for being sure whe~her a
learner had arrived at a stage at which it was fair to request him to
verbalize. I had observed many young teachers attempting to teach inductive lessons in which the class hour had degenerated into presentation
of examples by the teacher, then the question, "What do we see here?" But
no student in the class had "seen" anything. The lesson would then
become a guessing contest in which the students tried to find out what it
was the teacher had in mind. How to identify the unverbalized awareness
stage of inductive learning was, therefore, a most helpful supplement to
what we had known before. For the next nine years I continued on these
assumptions, each year finding out how to teach a few more topics in
secondary school mathematics by this kind of approach.
Transfer and Deduction
It was not until the Autumn Quarter of 1946 that there came an opportunity for more formal experimentation with the unverbalized
awareness approach to conscious generalization. However, during the
intervening nine years there was an impressive accumulation of evidence
that people were much more likely to convert knowledge into action when
it was obtained in this way than when it was obtained by an authoritative
verbal transmission. There had been a noticeable increase in retention of
what students learned and an increase in their power to use their
knowledge to solve problems. Classes were more animated, and their work
indicated greater interest and enthusiasm for the subject. More students,
both boys and girls, continued in mathematics or related fields beyond the
level of my own courses than had been the case in the past. It ?ecame
evident also that transmitting a generalization to others by settmg the
stage for this kind of learning was not limited to the field of mathematics.
Each year several of my student teachers "caught on" to how to do it.
Former student teachers returning to the campus for Homecoming and

14 UnverbalizedAwareness

Commencement often sought me out to tell me, "It works selling inurance too." Or "This way of putting across an idea is very valuable in
:he per~onnel work I am doing n_ow,'.'But all ~his time we were pressing
for verbalization as soon ~s apphcat10n behavior revealed that a learner
had achieved the unverbalized awareness stage.
I had been granted a sabbatical leave for the academic year 1946-47 to
study as a student-at-large at the Univ~rsity of Chicago. Althoug_hmost of
my courses were with Rudolf Carnap 1? the D~partment of Ph1losp?y, I
was also in Professor Guy T. Buswell s class m Advanced Educational
Psychology. Professor Buswell announced that instead of the conventional type of term paper, a member of the class might choose to
design and run an experiement. I submitted a proposal to investigate the
questicln:
To what extent, if any, does the way in which one learns a
generalization af feet the probability of his recognizing a chance to
use it ?13
I had found a certain little theorem in_number the~ry well adap_ted to
clarifying the difference between learnmg by authority and learm?g by
conscious generalization. During these nine years I had come to thmk of
transfer of learning as much more like deduction than anyone else seemed
to consider it to be. It seemed likely to me that when an organis~ solved a
problem by insight, the solution was reached by a deductiv~ fl_ash
generated from unverbalized awareness of an appropriate ~enerahzat10n.
Frequently the deductive application ~lso was ~nverbahze~, the conclusion revealing itself in problem-solvmg behav10r. What field theory
psychologists would call 'a single instance of insight' seemed to me ~ be
made up of an unverbalized inductive-ded':1ctive sequence ?r ~ chai~ of
such sequences. For the planning of teachmg I had been f_mdm~this a
much more illuminating explanation than the usual discuss10ns of
reasoning by analogy or by transduction. (I have never considered it a
mark of progress simply to assign a new name to an old mystery.) So, I
included a third group in the experiment design, not because I thought
subjects in such a group would do especially well in the experiment, but
simply because I wanted to call the attention of Professor Buswel~and my
classmates at the University of Chicago to the fact that there is an unverbalized awareness stage in learning by induction, and that the learner
can do something with the generalization even before it has emerged from
the unverbalized form to conscious level.
There were three prerequisites for an appropriate subjec~ in th~s experiment: (1) He must know how to add whole numbers of anthmeti?; (2)
he must know the multiplication tables; (3) he must be unable to give a
quick answer to a criterion problem such as, 'What is the sum of the first
thirty odd numbers?"
For an unverbalized awareness group the procedure goes as follows:
'What is the sum of the first thirty [or forty, or fifty] odd numbers?
Unverbalized Awareness 15

Will all who know the answer please raise their hands?" Nobody has
raised a hand in any of the experimental sessions.
''Let us work some easier problems instead. What is the sum of the first
two odd numbers?"
The subjects add 1 and 3 and announce "Four." They are then asked to
find the sum of the first three odd numbers. The subject adds 1, 3, and 5,
and announces or writes down, "Nine." The question is repeated for the
sum of the first four odd numbers. At this point, the teacher (or investigator) advises each subject to begin tabulating his data. If a chalk
board is used, the teacher writes:
The sum of the first 2 odd numbers is 4.
On the next line, ditto marks are used for each part of the sentence except
the new numerals, '3' and '9'. Each subject is told that if at any time he
thinks he knows the answer to the criterion question about the sum of the
first thirty odd numbers, he should write down his answer and raise his
hand. Anyone who jumps, for example, from the conclusion that the sum
of the first seven odd numbers is 49, to the conclusion that the sum of the
first thirty odd numbers is 900, has become aware of the generalization.
For subjects in the unverbalized awareness group, the directed learning is
terminated with this achievement. Any subject reaching that stage of
accomplishment is excused from the room.

For subjects in conscious generalization groups the procedure is exactly
the same to that point. Each subject in this group, however, is asked to
compose a sentence which states the generalization he has just used to
find the sum of the first thirty odd numbers. It is very rarely that a person
composes a sentence which says what he means on his first attempt at
such a verbalization.
This experiment was run five times, with a total of 42 subjects in the
five conscious generalization groups. The subjects included one group of
graduate students, one group of college sophomores in elementary
education, two groups of eleventh graders, and one group of ninth grade
students. Of the 42 subjects only two achieved on first trial a verbalization that did not have obvious counter-examples. For all the others,
correction of mistakes was promoted by the display of a counter-example.
For instance, if a person writes:
To find the sum of a number of odd numbers,
square the number of odd numbers.
the teacher asks,
"According to your rule, what is the sum of 7, 5, 11, 19 and 23?" The
subject's response is something like,
"Oh! The odd numbers have to be in order", or "Oh! The odd numbers
have to be consecutive." The sentence is then changed to:
The sum of a number of consecutive odd numbers is
the square of the number of numbers.
The revised sentence is tested in the same way.
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"According to your rule, what is the sum of 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29?" The
subject then exclaims,
"Oh! You have to start with 1." The sentence is again revised. This
t.esting of sentences continues until each subject has revised his attempts
into something that expresses what he means.
The other one of the experimental groups had the same generalization
present.ed in written form at the beginning. The sentence used in the
experimental work was:
The sum of the first n odd numbers is n 2 •
For mathematics students familiar with sigma notation for sums, the
sentence could be:

x=n

\/. L

(2x- 1) = n2

x=l

It must be understood that the domain of 'x' is the set consisting of all
natural numbers. The teacher, writing as he talked, would then say,
"For example, the sum of the first ten odd numbers is the sum of: [The
teacher writes the numerals in a column, talking as he writes.]
1
3

5
7
9
11

13
15
17
19

The class goes through the addition and finds the sum to be 100. The
teacher points out that this is indeed the square of ten. The subjects are
then given several application problems, the teacher assigning as many
examples as the maximum needed by any member of the other two groups
to make the discovery.
A few days later, in the first three runs of the experiment, the subjects
of all three groups were given a test consisting of twenty questions, each
of which could be answered by counting or by adding. Among them,
however were scattered seven examples which could be answered very
quickly the generalization learned in the experimental sessions was
used as a shortcut. The subjects were restricted to the test-paper margins
for workspace for adding, and pencil dots always identified those who had

if
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?ounted objects in an array_instead of noticing that the numbers of objects
m the rows were consecutive odd numbers. The ratio of the number of
application problems worked by the shortcut, to the possible total of
seven was used as the measure of transfer for each subject.
I was confident that conscious generalization subjects would do best on
the transfer performance. I suspected, since the first run was with rather
~ophisticated_graduate students (although none of them were specializing
m mathematics), that the group who had learned by authority would be
second best. But I knew that those for whom the teaching had been cut off
as soon as evidence of unverbalized awareness appeared would reveal
some power. They were in the experiment to force recognition of the
existence of this stage in abstract human learning as separate from the
achievement of verbalization.
As expected, those in the conscious generalization group did do more
than ty,rice as well on the transfer test as those who had learned by
authonty. But no one was more startled than I was to find that the unverbalized awareness group had not only done as well on the transfer test
as the conscious generalization group, but a little bit better. I felt that I
had hooked a much bigger fish than I could play.
Nevertheless, I changed registration for my Winter Quarter classes to R
registration (an arrangement at the University of Chicago by which a
student is permitted to attend classes and participate in discussion but is
not required to turn in written work or to take examinations), a'nd set
about ~ning the experiment two more times, once with elementary
education sophomores at MacMurray College, Jacksonville Illinois and
once with eleventh graders at the University High &hool at the
University of Illinois, Urbana. Both were places where I had interested
f~iends, and both were within one day's travel from Chicago by rail. This
time members of the groups were better matched for ability, and the
groups were larger. But the results of both runs were the same as with the
original run where the subjects were graduate students. The data from
these three runs of the experiment are those reported in the article "New
Clue to Transfer of Training". 13
'
By this time several prominent persons in the University of Chicago
Department of Education had become interested in this research.
P~ofes~or~urice L. Hart_ungpe~tted a fourth run of the experiment
with his rnnth grade class m the University of Chicago Laboratory School
as the subjects. The class of 24 was divided into three groups of eight
each, and the groups were very well balanced in ability, in view of the fact
that there were copious test records for these students in the files of the
Laboratory School. Although I did the teaching to each group, this time
the regular teacher administered the test, so that my presence could not
be a hint that the test had anything to do with what they had learned
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when I was with them. The test also had been refined somewhat by this
time, and the measures were considered sufficiently valid for rather
careful statistical treatment. The results of this run were the same as in
the first three runs of the experiment: The unverbalized awareness and
conscious generalization groups had more than twice as high a transfer
record as the group which had learned by authority, and the unverbalized
awareness group was a little bit better than the conscious generalization
group. By this time, statistical significance of the differences stood at
better than the one percent level required for confirmation of hypotheses.
When I returned to Eastern Illinois University at the close of my
sabbatical leave, I executed a fifth run of the experiment in my own
classes at the laboratory school in Charleston. The groups of eleventh
graders were small, and the controls were not very good. However, I did
eliminate possible effects of retroactive inhibition in the conscious
generalization group by postponing their verbalizing until a semester
review four months later than the original teaching. The transfer test was
given as a part of their regular semester examination. This time, the
conscious generalization group did just as well on the transfer test as the
unverbalized awareness group, but no better.
We are, of course, no longer dependent upon evidence from the learning
of this one little theorem in number theory. This instructional approach
has been written into almost all the materials of the four-year secondary
school mathematics program developed by the University of Illinois
Committee on School Mathematics. The UICSM not only produced
textbook materials; they also sponsored an extensive and intensive
teacher training program for teachers trying out the materials in the pilot
schools. I was the coordinator of the teacher training program. Many of
our teachers learned to handle the materials so that attainment of unverbalized awareness of each new concept and of each new principle was
recognized and noted with approval. These teachers learned to foster a
classroom atmosphere in which students considered it unsportsmanlike to
rob their classmates of the experience of discovery. Premature attempts
at verbalization were held to a minimum. Wherever our teachers learned
to operate in this way, there was a marked increase in retention of content
with power to use it, an increase in enthusiasm for the subject, and an
increase in the proportion of students who continued the subject beyond
each given level.
People who have been indoctrinated with the belief that "if you can't
tell it, you don't know it" find it difficult to accept that achieving a
linguistic formulation of an insight probably does not increase the
learner's ability to recognize opportunities to apply the learning. When I
am working with mathematics teachers, I remind them of the
mathematician's pride in being able to reason from non-factual premisses
as long as the premisses are consistent. I ask them to play the game for a
while with the temporary premiss that generalizing is fundamentally a
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non-linguistic process, and to see what conclusions emerge. This usually
forestalls rejection without trial!
Setting the stage for this kind of discovery -- that is, for the advent of
awareness -- is not easy. It requires enough insight into creative work in
one's academic field for one to think of a way in which the thing to be
learned might have been discovered in the first place. One must devise
examples that will come along close enough together in time and space for
the learner of average ability to "sense a sameness". This is the task to
which such a teacher, or such a writer, sets himself.
One now may ask himself about the two or three percent of the
population with highest intellectual ability, those who have always been
able to learn and to transfer their learning without an unverbalized
awareness approach, those whom Robert Maynard Hutchins designated
as 'the people who can learn from books'. These are the ones who have
acquired the knack of searching for instances or constructing instances
for each new generalization they read or hear. This is a difficult process,
but it is one by which a scholar can generate within himself an internal
awareness of a concept or a generalization. I am often asked if it is a
waste of time for such a student to be compelled to work through a
discovery sequence. My reply leads into the next section of this paper.
Transfer of Leaming to Learn
Very soon after I began to identify the unverbalized awareness stage in
the learning of generalizations, I noticed that the most able students in
my classes were generalizing the patterns of approach. They began to
initiate investigations that might lead to a shortcut for working several
tedious problems of the same kind. These self-initiated sallies into
research activity usually resulted in the discovery of mathematics with
which I was already familiar; but not always. The teacher also frequently
learned something new, and the most able students were experiencing
creative work and acquiring a taste for it. So when I am asked why
students who could learn from books should be channeled into learning by
discovery instead, I always cite the possibility of the outcome I have just
described.
It was not until 1967, however, that a careful piece of educational
research corroborated my claim. ''Transfer of Problem Solving Ability
Gained Through Learning by Discovery", a University of Illinois doctoral
dissertation by Herbert Wills ID, a former student and, by that time, a
colleague of mine in the UICSM, was completed in February 1967. Dr.
Wills himself wrote the units of instruction used in the experiment. They
were written in workbook form "to reduce the effect of the teacher
variable and to keep constant the teaching method".5 In the pilot study
the experimental class was taught by Dr. Wills himself, with no overt
verbalization of discoveries permitted in class. Three control classes were
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using a conventional presentation of the same content. Testing at the end
of one week showed that few students had acquired the ability to proceed
independently when faced with a new criterion task. Testing at the end of
two weeks, however, revealed that nearly every subject in the experimental class had a plan of attack for new problems. These test
problems were not examples in which they could apply some
generalization already learned; the students had to design and carry out
an investigation which would reveal some applicable generalization. A
revision of the plan after the pilot study introduced a so-called 'overt
group' in which the students were not only permitted to verbalize a
description of the procedures they were using, but also required to do so.
The subjects in the final study consisted of 24 classes in intermediate
algebra. Several schools and 19 teachers were involved. The pretesting
was done with considerable care and ingenuity. The sums of the eight
class means for each group of subjects on the posttest were: Covert,
244.14; overt, 232.66; control, 137.79. There had been no significant
differences between any two of the three groups on the pretest. The
differences betweeen experimental groups and control groups on the
posttest are so obviously decisive that one really does not need a careful
statistical treatment to judge significance of the results. However, the
differences in transfer achievement between the overt and the covert
groups were found not to be significant; the differences between experimental groups and control groups, however, were decisive. The
probabilty of those differences being accidental is well under the one-percent criterion for significance. The results show beyond doubt that the
students in the covert group did discover how to discover. Furthermore,
the students in the overt group, who had been reminded explicitly how
they had discovered, displayed no additional transfer power to "show for
their trouble". So, although some of us had been claiming this to be the
case for some time, there is now ample evidence to support the claim that
unverbalized awareness as an agency of transfer carries over to the level
of Leaming to learn.
Language and Adaptation
As soon as we become accustomed to thinking of learning left in the
form of unverbalized awareness as a medium through which, or source
from which, an organism copes with problems hitherto unforeseen, we are
confronted with a new question: How can it be that verbalizing one's
discoveries may actually detract from the learner's ability to apply them?
Or should we say the ability to recognize chances to apply them? What
can there be in the nature of the instrument called 'language' that could
account for this destructive effect on the dynamic power of insight?
Several studies since my own "New Clue to Transfer of Training,"'
which was published in 1947, have added to the evidence. Schwartz
(1948) 6 found a difference between the transfer success of those who
verbalized their discoveries and the success of those who did not verbalize
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much greater than the difference in the studies by Hendrix and Wills, but
Schwartz's subjects did not correct the mistakes they made in their initial
attempts at verbalization; sentences which did not say what was meant
were allowed to stand. In the Haselrud and Meyers (1957)7 experiment
with the learning of codes, the comparison was between effects of
learning by authority and effects of learning by discovery; the codes
learned by discovery were not verbalized.
Several hypotheses have been proposed for explaining loss of transfer
power after verbalization. Any possible effects from retroactive
inhibition can be avoided by postponement of verbalization until a later
and more appropriate time. For example, in the UICSM Introduction to
Algebra8, students learn to find sums and products of real numbers
through models from physical world situations; patterns appearing in a
tabulation of results reveal rules for shortcuts. These rules are not stated
until several months later, when the concept of the arithmetic value of a
real number has been named, when the real numbers have been ordered
by the relation less than, and after the language of the course has come to
contain letter variables and universal quantifiers. Only then do the
students bring forth as conscious generalizations the unverbalized rules
they have discovered and used for so long.
Another hypothesis has referred to the sensation of finality -- the
impression of having finished the thing and laid it upon a shelf -- which
descends upon one as soon as he has achieved a verbal formulation of a
discovery. Some think this feeling produces a kind of detachment from
the learning which interferes with the tendency to apply it.
There is another and more fearsome angle to this possible detachment
effect which accompanies successful verbalization of discoveries. This
very detachment is necessary if one is to be able to test his own
discoveries for truth and reliablity. When one has "discovered"
something false, as long as the discovery remains unverbalized, the person
cannot prevent himself from applying the false generalization. If a
teacher is on hand to confront the student with a counter-example to his
unverbalized learning whenever his behavior reveals possession of a
"false" awareness, the false "thing" learned can be obliterated in this way.
But if a person is working alone, the only way he can free himself from
the consequences of such ''learning" is to bring it to the conscious
generalization stage. Then he can examine his own discovery as if it were
proposed by someone else. The value of this power of detachment
through use of language is, in my opinion, on a par with its value for
communication. It is the great safeguard against transfer of unsound
learning. It is a procedure by which a person can free himself from
prejudices and other false impressions. As long as an organism holds a
generalization on the unverbalized awareness level only, the organism
cannot stop himself from applying what he has learned. The dynamic
effect of the awareness "turns on" whenever the organism is in a situation
to which the unverbalized generalization applies. A person "aware" of two
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contradictory generalizations is paralyzed by a situation in which both
generalizations "try to turn on" at the same time. Such states have been
produced over and over in animal behavior studies to reveal results that
could have been predicted a priori from the hypotheses reviewed in this
paper. It is a bit of the irony in the nature of things that language, the
very instrument which enables man to detach himself from unsound
learning instead of blundering on as a slave to it, is also the instrument by
which he may detach himself from sound and valuable learning to the
point of losing a tendency to apply what he knows.
I have proposed another hypothesis 9 which I believe partially explains
some of the losses of transfer power through verbalization of insights. If
the nature of language is what I suspect it to be , the person who writes or
utters in his mother tongue an incorrect verbalization of a new awareness
involuntarily experiences a literal interpretation of the sentence he ha~
composed. When this interpretation contradicts the original discovery,
the awareness itself may be mutilated. For example, I have seen a person
whose attempt at verbalizing the theorem about the sum of the first n odd
numbers culminated in:
To find the sum of a number of consecutive odd numbers
beginning with 1, square the last number named.
Although the person was giving correct answers to all the applications I
gave him before the verbalization, when I asked him after his verbalization to find the sum of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11, he answered "121" instead of "36".
I believe that the person who uses his mother tongue readily wth
correctness and precision is much less likely than others to diminish his
transfer power when he formulates his own discoveries. In fact, the
hypothesis above was generated originally from my noticing that the only
two conscious generalization subjects out of 42 who achieved a correct
verbalization on first trial also had perfect scores (seven out of seven) on
the transfer test.
The last hypothesis presented above has a strong appeal for scholars
who are uncomfortable when they contemplate the power of unverbalized
awareness. Some of my former colleagues on the UICSM Project staff at
the University of Illinois are stating flatly that this hypothesis is the
explanation. 10 Hence what we need to do is to give each child a more
careful beginning and higher standards in the use of his mother tongue. I
myself, however, suspect that the very nature of linguistic formulation
creates a necessary distortion of an insight.
I strongly suspect that all components of a discovery are "seen"
simultaneously in the "aha" flash of the learner. No matter how nearly
perfect the isomorphism between the insight and the language which
expresses it, stringing the insight out along the time axis in sentences is a
topological distortion. No matter how perfectly a correspondence bet-
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ween referents and symbols is preserved, this destruction of simultaneity
must, it seems to me, produce some kind of change in the relation between
the organism and his insight. Likewise, when one "reassembles" an
awareness by interpreting sentences which express it, the process must be
rather complicated and energy-expending. I suspect that this detour may
have something to do with its being to the advantage of the learner to
acquire a valuable awareness first in an unverbalized state. An awareness
achieved by interpretation of someone else's verbal generalization and a
subsequent search for instance&may never have the dynamic quality that
it might have had if obtained by discovery. This may be the case no
matter how gifted the learner.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
Finally let me reiterate that emphasis on the promotion of unverbalized
awareness in education for adaptation does not belittle the importance of
language. It does mean, however, that much of our high esteem for
language in human activity has been based on wrong reasons. It also
means that much behavior can be analyzed as evidence of subverbal
deductions based on unverbalized generalizations. Realization of the
potentialities of these ideas in education is hampered by the lack of a
plausible rationale of what goes on. I believe a new view of the nature of
language is required. But that is another subject, for another paper, 11 on
another day.
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Boston, 1964.
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PARTil
Anecdotal Reports of Incidents
Which Gave Rise to Hypotheses
Pertinent to the Proposed Research
Introduction
These reports are written to serve more than one purpose, and hence
may contain details of no apparent significance for immediate research
design. The accounts are presented in first person, informal narrative, in
the hope of giving other members of an interdisciplinary research team
maximum opportunity to classify the phenomena, design the experiments, and interpret results. Special care has been taken to include
conditions which might help explain the emergence of a rather unusual
set of hypotheses from a teacher who was probing the nature of learning
mathematics, studying formal logic and linguistics, and pursuing a horsetraining hobby all at the same time. Incident No. 1 marks the transition
from hobby to investigation.
These hypotheses are arranged to conform to the theoretical frame of
reference in terms of which the Principal Investigator proposes to interpret the data from this project. If this proposal were a teaching text,
each hypothesis should be withheld at least until the end of the related
anecdote. This order has been violated to produce an arrangement more
convenient for a reader's reference. Historical sketches are provided for
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background whenever such information may help new members of the
proposed research staff to consider these phenomena in relation to explanatory hypotheses other than those proposed by the Principal Investigator.
The breeding of the animals involved in these incidents is indicated
whenever it may suggest genetic qualities pertinent to selection of future
subjects for the research. An asterisk identifies individuals who are
descendants of Pepper Martin but not of Ella Jean; two asterisks, individuals descendants of Ella Jean but not of Pepper Martin; three
asterisks, individuals descendants of both Pepper Martin and Ella Jean.
No. 1. Society Twigg and Control in the Canter
Hypothesis: Animal learning can be interpreted as unverbalized
awareness of a generalization of the type which logicians call 'universally
quantified conditional'.
Individual: Society Twigg, bay gelding foaled 1928. (Sire: Leland Twigg,
by Jack Twigg, by Rex Peavine; dam: Society May Chief, by Hermit, by
Bourbon King.)
Date: May 1937
Incident: I had owned this horse since March 1936, and had been attempting to retrain him for a pleasure mount. He had been bred and
trained for the show ring, and had done pretty well as a junior five-gaited
horse in his four-year-old form. The following year he had become
unreliable in the ring. He had been sold at auction at Springfield, Illinois,
in November 1935, to Alvin Talbott, the riding academy owner from
whom I bought the horse. Although the horse had excellent stable
manners, he was unsafe to rent to most riders. He wou~dbecome excited
under the saddle, trotting faster and faster until he broke over into a
gallop. From such a moment on, he was a frantic runaway. I rode the
horse frequently on an indoor track during the four months preceding my
purchase. During the first year that I owned him, I succeeded in teaching
him to walk on command and to hold the trot on the indoor track without
breaking to a run. But I did not succeed in teaching him to canter with
poise. It was the first hot-blooded, highbred horse I had ever tried to
handle, and I soon learned that tiring the horse was no solution. If allowed
to do so, he would have worked until he dropped dead. (For example, I did
not dare to enter him in the local horse show in August 1936; I felt sure
that when it came time to canter I would never get him turned in the ring;
he would have disappeared into the dark at one end of the ring, and no one
would have seen him again until he had circled the half-mile race track
and popped into the lighted ring from the opposite direction at the other
end!)

As soon as the frost was out of the ground in March 1937, I tried a new
approach. It seemed to me that if I could make sure that whenever the
horse did canter,. it was at a slow speed and on a light rein, then after
enough consecutive examples without exception, he would come to
associate relaxation, slow speed, and light mouth with the foot-order and
rhythm which make up the gait called 'canter'. At the close of each
workout under the saddle on the indoor track, I took the horse to a small
enclosed, out.doorring. I dismounted and attached a longe rein to one ring
of the snaffle bit and, signaling the horse with voice and long whip taught
him to canter in a very small circle--a circle so small that he could not go
fast. A brief cantering lesson of this kind on each lead was the final part
of each day's workout.
After the first few weeks, I began to remain in the saddle for this part
of the day's schooling. At first I would occasionally feel the impulse to
plunge and to try to run come over the horse, but in so small a ring he
could do nothing about it and he always regained his poise before any
trouble developed. His canter became high and airy--almost a dressage
canter.
By the first week in May, I decided it might be safe to test the new
learning. I planned a six-mile ride on country roads, during the second and
third miles of which there were four level stretches with a steep hill at the
far end of each stretch. I planned to canter along the level stretch and to
bring the horse back to a walk on the incline, trusting the hill to help me
get him under control if he lost his head, clamped his teeth on the bit and
~to~
'
The first stretch of canter was negotiated with complete success. The
second was equally successful. (All four of the planned stretches of
~tering were on the part of the route which took the horse away from
his stable.) Intervals of walk, then trot, then walk were inserted between
each two places to canter. Everything went perfectly until we walked
around a curve where the third level stretch with a steep hill beyond came
in sight. Suddenly, my nice, quiet, well-poised horse began to snort and
dance. He put himself in position for the canter signal which he had been
taught, and he was so bursting with excitement and eagerness to do it
that I knew I did not dare to let him try it. Excited as he was he would
have lost his head and have tried to run--and all that I had acc~mplished
in two months of "conditioning" would have been lost.
Perhaps it was because I had been thinking much about the nature of
the generalizing process that year--1 had been meeting with my student
teachers in a seminar twice a week, a seminar in which we were
examining the literature on transfer of training, and trying to identify
what parts of prevailing theory, if any, applied to the teaching of
elementary algebra and plane geometry in the secondary school program.
In ~ of o~r lesson planning we were striving for an inductive approach,
one m which examples preceded stating of the principle or telling the
name of the concept. There were some bright, searching minds in this
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group of young people, and they asked good questions. In connection with
Judd's conscious generalization theory of transfer, someone wondered
aloud whether there was such a thing as non-conscious generalizing, or
unconscious generalizing, or subconscious generalizing. It was pointed out
that the only process which Judd contrasted with his conscious
generalization examples was the kind in which teacher or textbook stated
the generalization to be learned, before any examples were given. According to Judd, a learner experiences conscious generalization when he
himself composes a sentence which states the generalization, and he does
this from having noticed some similarity among examples presented to
him. The existence of a non-conscious (or unconscious, or subconscious)
state of mind corresponding to, or preceding, verbal formulation--this
question was neither discussed nor raised in the literature which we
examined.
Nevertheless, the question had continued to recur to me. And so, on
that morning ride in May, heartsick with failure of my long, tedious
sequence of horse-training lessons, even as I faced with dread the more
than three miles of struggle ahead of me to keep my horse from "running
away" home (that is, holding him to the speed of a walk as he pranced
along in a rough, slow trot), I became excited at the thought of what had
happened. Had not the horse generalized? If verbalized, what he had
discerned would be something likr, this: 'When we come to a level stretch
of road with a hill at the far end of it, then I am permitted to canter.'' In
the canter the feet come down in the same order as in the gallop. To a
powerful, healthy, highly-animated, hot-blooded horse on a cool May
morning, the desire to run must have been very strong. With this kind of
motivation, it seemed to me that the horse had generalized by the time he
came to the third appropriate stretch of road. The highly motivated
generalizing had cut through and taken precedence over eight weeks of
careful but unmotivated training based on the conditioned learning
hypothesis.
I changed all of my training tactics to conform to my new hypothetical
interpretation of the learning I was trying to promote. I owned the horse
until he died in 1943, a fine, healthy, brilliant horse at the time, taken by
a case of indigestion and bowel-impaction for which veterinary help came
too late. The horse became delightful to ride and drive, dependable to
show, a suitable mount for advanced instruction in equitation, and a good
mount for a trail ride. The summer I took him with me to Roxbury,
Vermont, he was one of the most dependable horses in the Teela-Wooket
Drill troop. A twelve-year-old girl rode him in the drill. And on three
occasions back in Illinois I rode him as one of the two marshalls for the
Eastern Illinois University Homecoming Parade at Charleston, with the
marching band directly behind us. The horse paraded as though his heart
would burst; his mouth stayed light; and he "kept his head" every step of
the way.
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No. 2. Lee Wray and the Drop of the Whip
Hypothesis: As soon as an organism becomes aware of a universal conditional whose "then" set (i.e., consequent set) is composed of events
producible by the organism, experiencing or perceiving a member of the
"if" set (i.e., antecedent set) will impel the organism to produce a member
of the "then" set; and such behavior constitutes acceptable evidence that
the organism has become aware of the generalization.
Individual: Lee Wray, chestnut registered Saddlebred mare foaled 1937.
Date: September 1940
Incident: Lee Wray, a junior five-gaited mare, was purchased in September 1940, from Mr. Fred S. Bailey, Champaign, Illinois, by Mrs. L. T.
Kent, Charleston, Illinois. Mrs. Kent was an equitation pupil of mine in
the Charleston Saddle Club, of which I was Riding Master. I took over the
training of the mare as soon as she was purchased, and set about the
project of getting the mare and her new owner ready for each other.

The mare worked with her nose too high, her mouth too hard, and her
neck too rigid. I used bitting harness work to correct this condition, and
since the mare was almost mature and very strong, the initial bitting
harness work entailed some violence. There was enough punishment
involved in getting her to go out on the end of the longe and move forward
freely, to make her afraid to stop on command. For two or three workouts
the only way I could stop her was to pull her in close to me by shortening
the longe; as soon as she was within lead shank distance, she would come
to her senses and obey the 'Whoa'. I would call the command, ''Whoa!",
and then proceed to force its execution by hauling the mare into the
center of the ring, hand over hand on the longe, repeating the oral
command once or twice. I do not remember when the following behavior
began, but I believe it was the Monday of the second week of the mare's
training with me.
On this occasion I took the mare out to the training ring, reined her up,
fastened the side checks which kept her from throwing her nose up into
the air, and sent her out on the end of the longe to work. When I was
ready for her to stop, I had been dropping the whip before I called the
command, so that I would be able to force obedience as quickly as possible.
I have always used an open bridle for this work, so that the horse can see
clearly in all directions. The instant I dropped the whip that day, the mare
came to a halt. I did not even have time to call the command. This
response to the drop of the whip in that mare's work on the longe was
consistent from then on.
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I interpret the behavior just described as evidence of awareness of
generalization--a generalization which if verbalized might read somewhat
as follows:

If the trainer drops the whip
then I am going to be brought
to a halt.
The awareness was quite clearly a conditional, not a biconditional (that is,
an if-and-only if), and not a conjunction (that is, it was not what some
psychologists think of as an association). It was not at all difficult to
establish the verbal command after the mare achieved the awareness
described above. I simply began to call the command before I dropped the
whip. Very soon I no longer needed to drop the training whip if I wished
to keep it in hand.
Discussion

This is only one of uncounted instances of this kind of evidence of
generalizing in my horse-training experience. In fact, I have found by
observation and by consultation with other horsemen that it is by just
such evidence that they recognize progress.
Another significant observation is that this kind of event ahnost always
occurs at the beginning of a new training session. (In the case recounted of
Lee Wray above, it came at the beginning of a lesson after a day of
complete rest.) The achievement seems closely related to what happened
at the very end of the preceding lesson--some accidental or incidental
success not contradicted by a later failure in the same workout. In fact,
rapid progress in training seems to depend greatly upon the trainer's
knowing when to terminate a lesson. This is something which cannot be
planned before the workout begins; if one does not terminate the workout
at the strategic moment, the chance for this mysterious progress which
seems to develop overnight during rest is destroyed. This phenomenon
seems to be common knowledge among expert horse trainers. One day as I
was bringing a colt in from the training ring, one of the most famous
harness horse trainers of all time called out in friendly greeting,
"Well, how did you get along today?"
I replied,
"Can't tell until tomorrow."
The man answered in a surprised and complimentary tone,
''That's RIGHT!!"
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It was a great mystery and frustration to me in the summer of 1958, to
find out that dogs do not seem to learn in this way. With some dogs, at
least, several successful repetitions seem to be needed immediately in
order to make the learning stick. When we were filming learning behavior
in the summer of 1959, the trainer of the puppy subjects observed the foal
learning film sessions also. He was amazed at the rapidity and the
stability of the learning. He had worked with several breeds of dogs. I
should add, however, that this equine stability and responsiveness is not
characteristic of all equine individuals, either. I have been involved with
two cold-blooded half-breeds whose learning patterns were much like
those of the dogs.
No. 3. Star Lane Chief and the Concept of Rack
Hypothesis: An organism can become aware of (i.e., acquire) a concept by
becoming aware of a universally quantified conditional in which members
of the "if" set are instances of the concept, and members of the "then" set
are instances of something desirable to the learner.
Individual: Star Lane Chief, chestnut gelding foaled 1935. (American
Saddlebred type, breeding unknown. The horse was purchased as a threeyear-old in the fall of 1938 by Henry Davis for Mr. Fred S. Bailey,
Champaign, Illinois.)
Date: June 1941
Incident: I had been interested in this horse for more than two years. He
was a beautiful prospect and exquisite in harness. While a four-year-old
he had almost died of a bowel-impaction. Blood transfusions had kept the
horse alive through the emergency. The high fever (107°) had left the
horse's front feet damaged, but not beyond serviceable soundness under
careful treatment and shoeing. The horse's conformation and way of
going indicated that he should be five-gaited. But when it came time to
teach him to rack, the horse had a nervous breakdown. Although proud
and brilliant in motion, Star was mild and affectionate and kind in his
attitude toward human beings--not arrogant like Society Twigg. Mr.
Bailey's trainer used harsh tactics with the horse, and Star simply could
not understand why his mouth was being treated so painfully. Sometimes
he would hit a rack for a few beats, but the horse was so distressed that
the success could not be confirmed and identified by a trainer working in
that way. The horse developed a roaring in his throat and was thought to
have a growth there--scar tissue, perhaps. He was sent to the veterinary
hospital at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Ames Iowa for
diagnosis, surgery, and treatment. The horse was sent ba~k with the
report that there seemed to be nothing wrong that they could correct.
Some local horsemen thought that the horse's wind was ''broken". The
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trainer announced to the owner that the horse would never really be able
to work and that the animal should be disposed of. Mr. Bailey did not
be~eve this to be the case. Shortly after the first of the year in 1941, Mr.
~~ley s1;1ggestedthat I t~e the horse, try to quiet him down for pleasure
ndmg, fmd a home for him, and keep half of what I could get for him. The
horse was delivered to me in Charleston on the first of March 1941.
I soon decided that the roaring was a nervous habit. The horse did not
make this sound when he worked in harness. Under saddle he worked
with his nose high in the air, his lower jaw tense, his neck muscles stiff. I
f?u1;1dthat I could m~e a similar noise in my own throat by assuming
srmilar muscular tensions. Star seemed to associate this sound with his
br~athing when he w~s ridden with a bridle having a curb bit. I destroyed
this pattern by working the horse in full bridle and bitting harness, out
away tr~m me on a twenty-five-foot longe rein. Before long he began to
fl~x his Jaw_to a touch on the curb reins. By June, I could bring him to
high collect10nunder the saddle and on a very light rein. When a true-totype American Saddlebred is in this position, the rack is a natural expressio1;1of excitement or exhilaration. I had not intended ever to try to
rack this horse; I was trying to make of him what is called 'an English
Pleasure Horse'--Saddlebred type ridden at the walk trot and canter but
not in highly stimulated show form. But one eve~ing ~t dusk it "happened".
I was riding alongside the railroad track on the backstretch of the Coles
County Fairgrounds racetrack, the horse in a fancy, highly collected walk,
whe!l the ev~ning passenger train came along. Although Star was not
af~rud ?f ti:ams, the roar of ~e tr~in so close by was quite exciting and
ammatmg m effect. Under this strmulation, the horse racked for a few
steps. I ~ismounted immediately. It was the only pleasant consequence I
could thmk of at the moment that would be dramatic enough to be
remembered. I led the horse the quarter mile into the stable, patting him
on the ~eek and complimenting him. I did everything I could think of to
make hrm feel good before he was put away for the night--warm water
sponging, rubdown, a few minutes of grass on the halter. The next
e~ening I rode him at the same time, having the horse at the same stage of
hIS workout when the passenger train was due. The events of the
preceding evening_wererepeated. The horse was not worked the next day,
bu~ th~ day followmg that, the third repetition of this sequence occurred.
This time the horse held the gait a little bit longer and I exaggerated the
~y movements of th~ rider which go with the gait. The next evening I
tried to hold the horse m the rack for a few steps after the train had gone
by, ~d succeeded. In fact, the horse was still racking when I stopped him
to dISmount.
The next ride was on Saturday morning of the same week, no train due.
I ~d decided not to try 1:°
"sh~e" the horse into a rack yet myself, but to
wait for the next evenmg nde. However, almost immediately after I
mounted I could sense some excitement and intentionality in the horse.
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There was something in his manner that suggested, "I know what I'm
going to do, and you're going to like it." As soon as I reached the smooth
surf ace of the race track the horse threw up his head, tucked in his chin,
leaned back, racked a few steps, stopped, and stretched in a show ring
pose for me to dismount!
I must admit that this unexpected turn of events presented a delicate
problem for a horse trainer, especiall_yone w_hooften had to ?perate by
equestrian tact instead of by professional skill. To have termmated the
workout then and there would have produced a rebellious balker.
Nevertheless, I dared not refuse to dismount; a counter-example to the
newly-formed generalization might have destroyed the learning. Long
before this I had become quite sensitive to the kind of evidence on which I
had to depend for knowing ·when a horse had become aware of a
generalization. The animal begins to produce events of the "if' set in order
to obtain an event of the "then" set. So I did dismount and compliment the
horse but much to his disappointment, I remounted and rode until he hit
the r~ck again and at a time when I was asking for it.
Star developed into the most brilliant five-gaited performer for many
miles around. Mr. Bailey was so pleased at seeing the horse fulfill the
promise to which it was born that he gave me the h?rse. ~en I_had to
disperse my horses in 1957, I took Star to ~y ~ster-m-la~ m New
Hampshire. There, at the age of twenty-seven he 1s still a beautiful ho~,
brilliant in motion, gentle to handle, and playful as a colt when he is
turned loose.
No. 4. Marshall Martin and the Prescriptive Stretch (See reference 2 for
historical sketch.)
Hypothesis: Although an organism usually discovers (i.e., becomes aware
of) a generalization at a moment when application of it is needed for
problem solving--that is, for attainment of some immediate material or
intellectual (curiosity) goal--the organism may l.aterbegin to use the same
application behavior as a communication device; this can be said to have
happened when the anticipated "then" event involves response from
another organism and is recognized as something which the other
organism can grant or withhold.
Individual: Marshall Martin*, bay gelding foaled April 1938. (Sire:
Pepper Martin; dam: Mystic Melody, by Marshall Chief.)
Date: February 1940
Incident: This event occurred when I had owned Marshall Martin for
about a month. After each work-out he was put into cross ties in the stable
aisle to be "untacked", rubbed down, and groomed before he was put
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away. He was being taught to stretch on command (that is, to stand in the
conventional position for conformation judging in the show ring), and I
thought he might learn faster if I would put him in that position each
night just before he was taken from the cross ties, and give him the piece
of carrot or apple which was usually a kind of "good-bye"treat. Very soon
he began to assume the position before I gave the command. He would
pose as soon as he could tell that the grooming was finished and that it
was about time for the treat anyway.
At this point, I would call the behavior 'problem solving'. It could have
been evoked by a mechanical device as easily and as dependably as by the
colt's trainer. Although I have no way of knowing just when this situation
shifted to communication behavior, I know very well when I knew that
the shift had taken place.
One evening the routine was interrupted by a visitor and some conversation right at the time the colt ordinarily would have expec~d to_be
given his treat and to be put into his stall. Although I was talki~g with
someone I became conscious of the fact that the colt was assummg the
stretch r:osition, holding it for a little while, and then relaxing, shifting
his feet, and starting all over again. Finally, after the third stretch, I
turned to look at him. He caught my eye and held it for a moment before I
turned back to the person with whom I was talking. Suddenly we were all
startled by a little jump in the cross ties. This time when I turned, the
colt's nostrils were dilated and his eyes blazing with indignation. He
struck the ground with an angry, peremptory stamp, and popped into the
stretch position again.
I went to the colt and calmed him by apologetic voice and caresses, but I
led him into his stall before I gave him the apple. It was a long time before
I fed him while he was standing in cross ties again, and I never again
made a routine of it.
Discussion.

It is unfortunate that such initiative on the part of such an animal has
almost always been discouraged because of the purpose for which the
animal was being developed. The problem with a fine equine prospect
which is to be a pleasure and satisfaction to ride (instead of the frenzied
half-crazed creatures we frequently see in the American show ring) is to
make a slave of the animal without destroying its pride and self respect.
The size, strength, and potential violence of the animal usually req~re
that its own initiative must be checked, if not destroyed. The horse IS a
highly social creature within its own species, and the complex social
relation between saddle horse and handler is one which might well foster
the development of a cross-species communication system if the horse
could be brought up so that it could exercise its initiative without endangering the handler. Plans for this research are based on existing
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evidence that such a horse may be allowed to live if suitable very early
training can be provided for an animal of appropriate hereditary temperament and intelligence.
No. 5. First Play Activity of New-born Foals
Hypothesis: There is an inborn tendency in_ mammals to indulg_e in
behavior which has no goal other than expression of mental or emotional
states; and primitive play is just such an expresson of pleasure due to wellbeing.
Individuals: Jean Caprice* *(1944); Mark Distinction* *(1946) Mello
Rhythm *(1948); Worthy Martin *(1949); Indiana Moon***(1948);
Hoosier Beam***(1949); Valjean MacDonald***(1955); Jubilee Charm* *(1957),Cinema Sal*(1959).
Dates: 17 June 1944; May 1946; May 1948; May 1949; April 1948; May
1949; June 1955; April 1957; June 1959, respectively. (Victory Charm**,
May 1945, did not display this behavior, but it may have been because her
front legs were strained during help given to the mare, Ella Jean, in
delivery. There was no observation on Count Down***, July 1960, until
he was five hours old.)
Incidents: In the cases of the nine foals named above, the first behavior
identifiable as play occurred when the individual was from two to three
hours old. Each had had a successful "first meal" by the time it was one
hour old (usually tasting the mare's milk first from some of it milked into
the hand of the attendant, and then very quickly locating the source of
the milk on the mare); this had been followed by a successful bowel
movement and successful bladder elimination and then at age about two
hours by a second nursing. Almost immediately after this second feeding,
each foal indulged in play--weak, clumsy, frolicking3 to be sure, but unmistakable play.
No. 6. Recreational Problem Solving
Hypothesis: Problem solving is sometimes play--i.e., an end in itself.
Individuals: Marshall Martin*, bay gelding foaled April 1938. (Sire:
Pepper Martin; dam: Mystic Melody, by Marshall Chief.) Hoosier
Beam***, bay mare foaled May 1949. (Sire: Pepper Martin; dam: Ella
King, by Captain King and out of Ella Jean.)
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No. 7. Indiana Moon*** and Mello Rhythms* Fright
Incidents:

A. Marshall Martin* and the Water Hydrant
Date: Spring 1946
Marshall was having his first fling at the freedom of a pasture since his
yearling form but he soon became "bored" with the place and _started
taking things ~part. There was a water h)'.drant in his pasture which was
turned on and off with a round faucet fixture. A large. bucke~,of fres~
water was drawn for him there twice a day and left for hrm. He worked
with that faucet until he learned to turn it on-but, not ~cause he _wa~ted
a drink· there was fresh water before him. Apparently his only obJe~tive-and re~ard!--was seeing something different happen as a result of his own
efforts.
d
ff ·
To prevent this mischief, the owner had an undergroun turn-o mstalled a bent bar almost at ground level which was hard to turn and had
to be ~oved ninety degrees before manipulating the faucet would_turn the
water on Marshall learned to work that one, too. He operated this second
device with his foot, but the other one was turned by his mouth and ~eth.
He was watched at this "game" several times with the observer hidden
from his sight. He never drank after he succeeded in turning on the water.
(Neither did he ever turn it offl)

B. Hoosier Beam ***and the Electric Fence Gate
Date: Spring 1958
This mare was turned out daily with two other horses in a four-acre
paddock enclosed by a two-strand elect~c fence. The gate was~ single
wire ending in a hook which was hooked mto a loop of charged wire. The
hook was on a spring which was covered by a wooden handle. The
caretaker began to fi:id the horses loose wandering all around !he
Fairgrounds amost every day, gate "open"-that is, disconnected and lymg
on the ground. Police were alerted to be on the look-out for the vandals.
But, the caretaker caught the culprit himself. One morning shortly before
noon when Hoosier Beam had had all the grass she wanted, he saw her go
to th~ gate, carefully take the gate handle into her mouth, unhook it, and
lay it down. She did not come through the gate herself. Instead she
strolled back farther into the paddock. The other horses had spotted the
open gate and were on their way to it by the time the care~er reach_ed
the spot. A different gate was designed _andinstalled-~ne which ~oosier
Beam did not have room to operate with her nose without gettmg an
electric shock.
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Hypothesis: Organisms are se~sitive to counter-examples of
generalizations held on an unverbalized awareness level, and subsequent
investigative behavior may be mistaken for a consequence of communication; unverbalized awareness of a conditional is accompanied by
awareness of its contrapositive also.
Individuals: Indiana Moon***, chestnut filly foaled 25 April 1948 (Sire:
Pepper Martin; dam: Ella King** by Captain King and out of Ella Jean),
and Mello Rhythm*, chestnut colt foaled 12 May 1948 (Sire: Pepper
Martin; dam: Worthy Mary, by Selworthy, by Rex Peavine).
Date: June or July 1948
Incident: On this occasion the stable boy was unhitching a horse in the
stable aisle preparatory to sponging it and cooling it off after work. A pail
of water with an electric water heater submerged in it was resting on the
ground at one side of the ~isle. A hissing sound arose ~rm~.the bucket in
which the water was heatmg. The brood mares, Ella Kmg and Worthy
Mary, and their foals, were browsing loose in the adjoining stable. Unnoticed by the groom, Mello Rhythm slipped into the barn and, curious
about the hissing sound at the water bucket, went over to investigate.
When he finally touched his nose to the bucket, he received an electric
shock that sent him across the aisle against the wall and then scurrying
out into the lot in a frantic rush to get to his mother for protection. His
playmate, Indiana Moon***, reacted immediately to the colt's terrified
behavior. She left her mother and started toward the barn, soon appearing at the doorway, neck arched, nostrils dilated, ears sharp, and
"walking on eggs.". The stable boy asked:
''Miss Hendrix, did Tuny go out there and tell her that there was a
great big terrible thing in here?"
I interpret the incident as due to the filly's curiosity aroused by a violent
exception to the colt's usual pattern of behavior. The filly was aware of a
generalization which corresponded, perhaps, to:
For each time t, if at t things are normal in the stable then at ta
horse does not come out the door frightened.
Mello Rhythm's* terrified exit was the negation of the consequent of an
instance of this generalization. Logically the colt's terrified exit was also
the antecedent of an instance of the contrapositive of the original
universal conditional:
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For each time t, if at t a horse comes out the stable door frightened
then at t things are not normal in the stable.
Hence, coexistent with Mello Rhythm's* frightened exit should be a
contradiction of the instance of the "if' set of the original generalization:

turned her head toward the approaching car and made two in-and-out
pointing gestures. By that time the car had reached the corner and was in
the act of turning. The mare relaxed, faced forward, and moved on across
the highway without any further signal or command. (Her manner indicated apology, but not embarrassment. Needless to say she received
some compliments and a pat on the neck.)
'

....things are not normal in the stable.
Indiana Moon*** was conducting a self-initiated investigation to verify
her inference.

No. 9. Foals, age 7 hours to 1 month (possibly older), and Cross Species
Mimetic Behavior

No 8. Indiana Moon*** and the Pointing Gesture

Hypothesis: A foal may respond to a human handler who has been a part
of the foal's daily environment f ram birth by trying to imitate sounds or
gestures of the handler. Rewarding similar spontaneous mimetic events
can result in emergence of a predictable behavior pattern on the part of
the foal.

Hypothesis: Under the stress of resolving a counter-example to a
generalization, an organism may invent a new communication device
which depends upon another generalization hitherto unused.
Individual: Indiana Moon***, chestnut mare foaled April 1948 (Cf No. 7)

Individuals: Indiana Moon***, Hoosier Beam***, Count Down***,
Jubilee Charm** (gestures only), Cinema Sal* (gestures only).

Date: November 1956
Dates: 1948, 1949, 1960, 1957, 1959, respectively.
Incident: By the time Indiana Moon*** was eight years old she had been
started in preparation for three different careers. Her training had been
changed each time her prospective new owner became a different person.
Since April 1956, I had been retraining her for a pleasure mount for my
brother, William L. Hendrix, of Amherst and Milford, New Hampshire.
When I joined the UICSM Mathematics Project in the fall of 1956, I
brought the mare to Champaign-Urbana with me and continued her
training.

The mare was quartered in a barn at the southwest corner of
Springfield Avenue (Illinois Route 10) and Mattis Avenue. I was permitted to work the mare on a stretch of path under a row of trees on the
north side of Route 10, across from the stable. I always brought the mare
to a halt before crossing the highway--a habit developed for traffic safety.
(She had to be taught to make the stop; Indiana Moon is the kind of
animal who would demand the right-of-way, expecting everything else to
stop for her, if she were left to her own devices.) As soon as the way was
clear I would give her the conventional leg pressure to go forward, and we
would cross over to the work path. Sometimes we could go immediately;
sometimes we waited for one or more cars to pass. I had always given the
forward signal, and I thought the decision was always mine.
This time after the first two cars had passed there was a third car approaching the Springfield-Mattis intersection from the east, but its leftturn signal lights were flashing. Consequently, I signaled the mare to go
forward. Instead of the forward motion, which some psychologists would
have considered a reflex to the leg pressure, the mare froze in protest. She
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Incidents: I greeted each of these foals each time I came within sight and
earshot with a 'Hi There!', my chin lifted and head thrown back on 'Hi'
return to natural position on 'There!' All five of the foals above began~
mimic the head motion in reply. Indiana Moon *** also began to reply
with a non-equine sound, a high note slurred to a lower one, change of
pitch corresponding to the 'Hi There!', but nothing corresponding to vowel
sounds or consonants. Hoosier Beam*** learned to "go on" at some length
with sequences of something like crooning. When being petted and talked
to while lying down, Count Down*** produced a prolonged and repeated
gutteral muttering; sometimes it was a little like the purr of an enormous
cat. (Count Down*** also began to croon as a yearling when he was
stabled next to Hoosier Beam***. It may have started earlier and not
have been noticed.)
The "crooning" produced by Hoosier Beam*** and Count Down*** has
always had a whining quality, and it has never become sufficiently
patte~ed for ~he handler to work o~t a procedure for evoking the
behaVIor at will. The most recent witnessed example from Hoosier
Beam*** was during a horseshoeing job in May 1962. The mare was
standing in cross ties enduring the monotony with controlled impatience.
She finally broke the tension with a long series of her whimsical sounds
apparently getting some satisfaction from the startled attention of ali
conventional horsemen within earshot. The mare was then 13 years old.
The most recent instance from the two-year-old stallion Count Down***
was on Friday, 23 November 1962. The colt had bee~ worked, rubbed
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down, and tied up to his hay manger with his back to me and my brother,
William L. Hendrix, then visiting Champaign from New Hampshire. We
were discussing the colt--his performance, condition, and possible future-without paying any attention to him at the time. The colt ''broke into the
conference" with a long sequence of his whimsical whines. He was
rewarded with attention--apparently the response he desired. Although
the colt had been in Mr. Hendrix's stable from 11 June 1962 to 28 August
1962, he had never heard the colt make these sounds before.
The most outstanding of these apparent mimeses, however, was the
humming sound initiated by Indiana Moon***. Each morning or evening
from the time that she was foaled, she was petted and talked to while she
lay on fresh bedding with her head in the handler's lap. There may have
been something like lullaby sounds in this ''talk" from the handler, and
there were many questioning 'hm-m-m-m?'s. When the little filly was
about three weeks old, a high-pitched hum, like a telephone wire singing
in the wind, was traced .to her stall, where she was found stretched out in
contentment "singing" to herself. The handler slipped down beside her
gently, caressed her, and imitated the sound whenever the filly stopped.
These events always took place when the filly was well fed, clean, and
comfortable, suffused with well-being. It soon became possible for the
handler to initiate one of these humming "conversations".
No. 10. Indiana Moon*** and her Referentwl Hum
Hypothesis: An expressor (sound or gesture) which an organism has used
consistently in only one kind of pleasant situation may break through to
the status of a symbol in a contrasting situation, where the organism
under stress suddenly uses the expressor to refer to the pleasant situation
which is absent but desired.
Individual: Indiana Moon***, chestnut mare foaled 1948. (Sire: Pepper
Martin; dam: Ella King**.)
Dates: November 1948; May 1949
Incidents: The first of these incidents occurred during the week following
the weaning of the filly. Her weaning had been postponed from the age six
months to age seven months so that I could take advantage of the
Thanksgiving recess from University duties to be able to school the filly
on several consecutive days. All of the descendants of Ella Jean (See
Incident No. 14) involved in this study except Count Down*** have been
taught to work on the longe in both directions during the week following
weaning. Although this is a difficult time to obtain and hold a weanling's
attention, the novelty and diversion of this first work seems to help the
young animal in its psychological adjustment to living without its dam,
and if successful it establishes responses to human authority and
direction which diminish the probability for necessary rough handling
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when work starts at a later age.
It usually takes three or four lessons for the weanling to learn to go out
on the longe away from the handler and work in a circle. As soon as this
learning has occurred and the "new" has worn off, there is a session
during which the colt (or filly) must be taken beyond the expression of
curiosity and pent-up energy; there comes a moment when the command
to go forward is a demand for work; the colt decides that it is tired of the
game, and it rebels. Instantly--before its muscles have frozen into a halt, if
possible--thecolt must be sent on. Frequently this requires the colt's first
lash of a whip for an incipient refusal to obey. If the timing is just right,
the colt will get into motion without further })Unishment;all that is
needed after the first lash is the handler's voice and wave of the whip. But
quite suddenly the colt begins to feel sorry for itself. At this stage in the
week's work all other foals with which I have carried out this routine have
begun to cry for their mothers--long, loud, plaintive neighs for the one to
whom they are accustomed to turn for protection. Instead of doing this,
Indiana Moon, even as she complied with the demand for forward
movement, burst into a loud, plaintive hum. There was an urgency in the
sound that differed from the little song of contentment which I had heard
before only when the filly was lying relaxed and secure near her mother's
feet on a clean straw bed. At those times I had been coming to her as
quickly as possible and dropping down on the straw beside her, caressing
her, imitating the sound whenever she stopped, and frequently placing
her head in my lap. It seems possible that this sudden use of the hum out
in the raw November wind, a long way from the barn, may have been
expressive of an intense longing for the situation that was not there--that
is, it seems that at the moment the sound was no longer merely an expressor; it had become a symbol referring to the state of being for which it
had originally been an expressor.
There were two similar instances the next spring, one when the filly
was being ground-driven (driven in harness, guided by long lines held by
the driver walking on the ground), and the other during the second time
she was hitched to a cart. Each time she had started to rebel been
corrected, and quickly gone on with her work. But with the com~liance
each time came a loud, sustained hum.
No. 11. Hypothesis: (This one is a corollary derived from Hypothesis No.
10. Same individual; same dates). An expressor used referentially under
stress may constitute a break-through on the part of an organism from a
more primitive communication device to the use of symbols.
Discussion.

. Such signals are commonly attributed to crows, for example, but there
1s no record of such behavior among domesticated horses. (No study of
wild horses which might reveal use of such communication has been
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carried out.) Neither do I have any way of knowing whether Indiana Moon
would have hummed when she first found herself in distress if the same
handler who had been a party to the earlier "humming conversations" had
not been a part of the scene when the filly, still grieving for her mother,
first found herself troubled by a demand for work. I have no way of
knowing whether she was trying to communicate with me as well as to
communicate with herself. She may simply have been trying to comfort
herself by making the sound accompanying the comfort and security that
had always before been present with the sound. But in either case, the
hum seems to have been referential, and very close to the nature of
symbol.
At that time I did not realize the possible significance of what was
happening for theory of learning, theory of communication, and theory of
instruction. In all three cases I remained stern until the workout was
finished. If instead I could have invented some response to the situation
that would have confirmed a referential use of the sound, it seems to me
that a symbol might have become a part of the filly's communication
behavior. I have thought possibly that if I had begun humming with the
filly and kept it up at frequent intervals all the way back to the stable,
taken her to a freshly bedded stall, and stayed with her for a while, the
thing might have been accomplished.
Indiana Moon, now almost fifteen years old, still hums frequently. The
sound seems now, however, usually to be an expression of protest or
impatience--for example, when she is being held to a walk for a long
distance at a time when she wants to move out into a trot.
No. 12. Hypothesis: (A second corollary to Hypothesis No. 10) A symbol
functions in communication as a universal biconditional generalization.
Discussion.

Suppose Indiana Moon's humming had become a fully-formed symbol
denoting the state of reclining relaxed, secure, and well-fed on a clean
straw bed in her stall. Not only could she have referred to that state of
being by humming whenever she had such a situation in mind, but also
hearing the hum (her own hum or another's imitation of it) would have
reminded her of the state of being. Such a symbol could be described as
follows:
If I "think" of lying secure, well-fed, and comfortable in my stall
then I "think" of humming,
and
if I hear humming then I "think" of lying secure, well-fed and
comfortable in my stall.
Another way of putting the biconditional is:
I "think" of humming
if and only if
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I "think" of lying secure, well-fed,
and comfortable in my stall.

If two individuals--twin foals, for example--were to share the same
experience while one of them developed an unusual expressor such as
Indiana Moon's humming, and if the second twin were sensitive enough
not only to imitate the sound but also to notice the only kind of situation
in which the sound occurred, then the sound evoked under stress on a
cold, winter day would communicate the thought of the situation to the
companion.
No. 13. Hypothesis: (A third corollary to Hypothesis No. 10.) The kind of
symbolic communication event outlined under Hypothesis 12 may constitute a sharply defined stage in evolution from lower to higher forms of
mammal life.
Di,scussion.

The foregoing hypothetical outline of symbol invention culminating in
symbolic communication can be correlated completely with Tervoort's
description' of communication developments among very young deaf
children left to their own devices. That this development may also be a
stage in evolution from lower to higher forms of mammal life--this is a
conjecture not heretofore entertained as far as I know. The strain of
animals now available for this proposed research with horses provides
what may be a unique opportunity for investigating this question. The
cross-species situation in which a human handler cognizant of the
hypothesis plays the role of the hypothetical twin companion might evoke
the critical event. Furthermore, this might occur when there were
planned preparations for confirming the first symbolic communication by
some appropriate consequence. Such research design will require considerable ingenuity, and success should not be expected until the research
team has worked with and observed appropriate subjects for two or three
consecutive years under increasingly appropriate conditions--and with
increasingly appropriate subjects, if judicious breeding can produce them.
No 14. Ella Jean and the Appeasement Stretch (This incident was recalled
and reinterpreted after the November 1948 humming incident with her
granddaughter, Indiana Moon. See No. 10)
Hypothesis: Communication occurs when the sending organism, being
aware of a generalization of the universal conditional type, produces an
event of the "if" set for the purpose of impelling a receiver who is also
aware of the same generalization to infer an example of the "then" set.
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Individual: Ella Jean, chestnut mare foaled 1930. (Sire: Jean Val Jean, by
Rex Pea vine; dam: daughter of Red Rex, by Rex Peavine.)
Date: June 1944
Incident: Ella Jean was thirteen years old when I bought her in 1943. She
was a small mare, height barely an inch over fifteen hands, an individual
of excellent Saddlebred motion and conformation, except for a very low
back and eyes which showed an unusually wide ring of white when she
was excited. I had seen all three of the foals she had produced since she
was brought to Charleston, Illinois, from Shelbyville, Kentucky, in the
winter of 1938-39. They were by three sires of very different breeding, all
foals of high quality physically, and all three distinctive in temperament
and intelligence--and all three bore unmistakable physical resemblance to
their female parent. The mare was an outlaw, arrogant, stubborn, and
dangerous to handle. It was almost impossible to load her for transportation except when she had a foal which could be loaded first; then
one could simply out-wait her resistance until distress at being separated
from her foal would overcome her determination not to be loaded. When
that stage came, she would break out all over in a sweat, droop all over, as
with humiliation, and walk slowly into the trailer or truck. She had
missed producing a foal in 1941, and had missed again in 1943. Her
owner, Roy P. Talbot, had drawn her from a load of seven mares brought
up from Kentucky for a Green Pastures Farm brood mare club. The foal
she was carrying at that time was by Hallmark Peavine; the second was by
Pepper Martin; and the third, Ella King**, was by Captain King. When I
bought Ella Jean in June 1943, she was thought to be in foal again to
Captain King.
Workwith the strange old mare from that date to the time of this incident is a long, long story. For one thing, there had been a long series of
attempts to teach her to stretch. (In order to finance a second foal, I knew
I would have to be able to sell the first. To show the mare and foal to
advantage, one must teach the mare to assume the stretch for conformation judging. Besides, the best way to establish rapport with the
creature seemed to be to teach her something.) It was a long time before
we could even pick up her feet with any degree of confidence. If anything
worked, it was always a quiet but insistent low-voicedurging. She grew to
like and appreciate the body grooming, but if the foot-handling went on
too long, the old mare expressed her impatience by slamming her foot
down on someone's toe.
After her feet could be handled we began to place them by hand in the
position of the stretch, and when we could get her to hold the position
long enough, we would give her a piece of apple for a reward. She always
moved her feet immediately after receiving the reward. When her foal
arrived, we fixed up a web halter and taught the little filly to lead when
she was three days old. We did not attempt to lead the mare; when we
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wanted to move them from barn to paddock, we led the foal and let the
mare follow.
On the occasion of this incident, the mare was a bit irritated about
something, and she crowded through the paddock gate with me and the
little filly and stepped on one of my feet as she went through. I thought-and still think--that she meant to do it. I whirled and spoke to her in
anger--something I had not done before in all the year's work, knowing
from the three hours horror I witnessed during her loading on the day she
was delivered to me, that one could not handle her by threat. At that
moment I (like Roy Talbot, I suppose) was ready to give up and have her
shot. I remember saying aloud,
''This is one time too much!"
To my amazement, instead of replying with the usual defiant toss of her
head, she looked stricken. She was standing free, about seven feet from
me, but I still had the little filly in hand on the halter. 5 I was utterly
dumfounded to see the old mare face me and assume a beautiful show ring
pose in a perfect stretch. Her expression was eloquent with apprehension
and hope. She had selected from the year's experience the thing she
thought would please me most, and had used it--to allay my anger? to
apologize?I don't know. It was her first indication that she even cared for
my approval. I went to the mare and caressed her and talked to her. She
never injured me again. I owned her until I had her destroyed in midsummer 1950. (I had always believed her low back to be due to poor
nutrition while she was carrying and nursing foals. Her get all had strong,
level, short backs. Her teeth had been worn almost to the gums, apparently by grazing on sparse, dry, sandy pasture. At the age of twenty,
her teeth were so bad that she could no longer keep herself in flesh during
winter. The horses were being moved to another stable that fall, and it
seemed kinder to have the old mare shot than to try to force her through
another loading.)
Hypotheses Pertinent to Question II16

No. 15. Pre-bridle-wiseWork for Colts
Hypothesis: Unverbalizedawareness of a universal conditional does not
produce a correspondingawareness of the converse of the conditional;
however,a universal conditionalis learned more readily by a subject who
is alreadyawareof the converseof the conditional.
Individuals:
Scarlet Letter, three-year-old filly, 1942
Burnt Ciana, yearling filly, 1943
Two-year-oldfilly, full sister to Burnt Ciana, 1943
Jean Carpice **,yearling filly, 1945
Jubal Dare*, three-year-old filly, 1945
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Victory Charm**, yearling filly, 1946
Captain O'Neal, yearling stallion, 1946
Blaze O'Glory, yearling gelding, 1947
Captain Chipper, two-year-old gelding, 1947
Pimworthy*, yearling stallion, 1948
Indiana Moon***, yearling filly, 1949
Hoosier Beam***, yearling filly, 1950
Roger Young Pea vine, two-year-old gelding, 1950
Yearling filly owned by F. S. Bailey, 1953
Three-year-old filly owned by F. S. Bailey, 1953
Jubilee Charm**, two-year-old filly, 1959
Count Down***, yearling stallion, 1961
Two-year-oldstallion, 1962
(Note: Captain O'Neal, Blaze O'Glory, and Captain Chipper were by
Captain King but not related to Ella Jean.)
Dates: As indicated above with names of the individuals involved.
Incidents: Each of the above named animals was taught to work in the
bridle on the longe before any attempt was make to guide it with reins.
(Four of them--Jean Caprice, Pimworthy, Indiana Moon, and Hoosier
Beam--had their first work on the longe with the halter only, when they
were about six months old.) All the yearlings, two-year-olds, and threeyear-olds, wore a bridle with a coarse snaffle bit over the halter. At first
the longe was attached to both halter and bridle, the bridle attachment
being a floating ring on a chin strap. Pressure on the bit could not be felt
until a colt was pulling with too much resistance on the halter. Each
learned the feeling of a bit in its mouth in this way, and learned to protect
its mouth from unnecessary abuse. This preparatory training was continued after two lessons with the introduction of the bitting harness.
Check reins, one of which tended to keep the colt from throwing its head
too low, the other from throwing its nose up into the air, were introduced.
Both the elevating check and the side checks were kept loose enough to
allow considerable natural movement of head and neck, but they were
tight enough to promote learning of respect for the bit.

By the fifth or sixth lesson the longe rein was run through the ring of
the bit on the side next to the trainer who was handling the longe, and
then attached to the ring of the halter. From this time on, there was slight
pressure on the side of the bit toward which the colt was turning
whenever it worked in the ring. After a few more lessons, each colt
worked with the longe rein attached only to one side of the bit. Perhaps it
should be recorded that each time the colt was exerting no pressure
against the bit. These colts were never left standing reined up in bitting
harness. I have always thought that this had something to do with the
light, responsive mouths with which all but one of them worked. (Captain
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Chipper was the exception; even his lack of responsiveness may have been
traceable to experiences previous to the time he came into my hands.)
As soon as each colt (except one) was flexing its neck naturally toward
the direction of its turn in the longe work, but before the work became too
monotonous, the colt received its first ground-driving lesson. The exception to this procedure was Count Down. He was well started in this
work as a yearling, but I did not have adequate help or facilities for
carrying through the ground-driving and hitching lessons which I consider so important for yearling form.
When this training routine was first planned, the idea was to prevent
the mouth injuries, psychological if not physical, so often inflicted on a
colt when it is first learning to work in a bridle. Some of the other trainers
whom I was observing used rubber bits for this first work. I thought it
made most of the colts too hard-mouthed. I wanted to use the same kind
of bit that is used for control, and I wanted the colts to learn in a way that
would forestall their injuring themselves during moments of frantic and
reckless rebellion. A colt whose first training is ground-driving turns its
head but not its body when the trainer first increases pressure on one rein.
I wished to teach a colt to associate rein pressure on one side of its mouth
with turning in that direction before I tried to ground-drive the colt.
The scheme did not work. When it came time to be ground-driven, not
one of the animals listed above knew what the first rein pressure on one
side was supposed to communicate. They all turned their heads but not
their bodies. What they had learned instead was:
If I am turning to the left then there is pressure
on the left side of my mouth.
If I am turning to the right then there is pressure
on the right side of my mouth.
The learning was not of the if-and-only-iftype.
The preparatory work on the longe, however, was not totally unsuccessful. Every animal in the list above except Captain Chipper learned
to be turned by the bridle within the first fifteen minutes of instruction.
The race horse trainers with Standardbred colts were frequently having
trouble guiding the colt after a full week's work.
Count Down's case was particularly interesting to me. There was a ten
months' lapse between his learning in the bitting harness and his first
lesson at being driven from the ground. Furthermore, the two-year-old's
schooling was at the hands of a different trainer. Added to that, was the
change to a bridle with blinkers. (I always did this work with an open
bridle, so that a colt could see where it was turning.) But even in the
presence of these possible handicaps, Count Down also learned to be
guided by the reins within fifteen minutes of instruction. I was permitted
to witness the lesson, but the trainer did not know that I was looking for a
possible carry-over from the yearling training on the longe. He just
thought he had a "mighty smart colt" whose trainer was "mighty good"
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that day.
Thus, although there was no evidence that any one of these colts
was aware of the conditionals;
If there is pressure on the left side of my mouth
then I turn to the left.

she would anticipate the next one, alternating directions during a
workout of from two to three miles. Her b~ha_viorat the first reversal of
direction each time that she was worked indicated clearly that she was
aware of a universal alternation,
When I turn around, I turn to the left or I turn
to the right.

If there is pressure on the right side of my mouth
then I turn to the right.
nevertheless the fact remains that sixteen of these seventeen colts
became aw~e of these generalizations in about one-fifth o~ the t~me th~t
it usually takes a colt to learn them--that is, to become bndle-wise. This
seems to me to indicate some neural relation between converse conditionals, even though two such generalizations are logi?ally independent.
Just what is back of this may have to be left to neurological research.

But she also became aware tha~ if she tur~ed to the left one ti~e then she
turned to the right the next time, and vice versa. Her behavior at subsequent turns indicated that these awarenesses functioned as,

No. 16. Victory Charm** and Prediction of Turns

or,

Hypothesis: Unverbalized awareness of ~ ur:iversal_generali~ation is
accompanied by awareness of other generalzzatwns logically equivalent to
the first.

If I am not to turn to the left then I am to turn
to the right.
If I am not to turn to the right then I am to turn
to the left.

King; dam: Ella Jean.)

These two contrapositive conditionals are each logically equivalent to
the original alternation. To solve the training problem, I had to quit
alternating the direction of turn. Sometimes I would turn twice in the
same direction, sometimes three times in the same direction, before
turning around in the opposite way.

Date: Summer 1947

Discussion.

Incident: At this time my horses were kept at the A. S. Roby farm, one

Again, as is so often the case with horses, the animal's cleverness,
eagerness to learn, and initiative had to be discouraged in order for her to
be made into a good horse. For the research outlined in this proposal,
situations must be created in which the initiative of these animals can be
encouraged without the animal being spoiled or handler being endangered.
Similar evidence of logically equivalent unverbalized awarenesses was
obtained in the rat study carried out for the film, "Advent of Awareness".
The film shots clearly record the behavior which indicates this state. The
one rat (of twelve) which learned that if it made a wrong turn on the maze
then the buzzer sounded, also showed that it was aware of the contrapositive generalization:
If the buzzer does not sound, then I am going the right way.
At each branch in the maze the rat, on the way to a food pellet in one of
eight cups, would hesitate perceptibly, listening to see if the buzzer was
going to sound. Silence of the buzzer would send the animal on with speed
and assurance. The position of the food pellet on each trial was determined by lot. The man operating the buzzer could guide the rat to any
chosen one of the eight terminals on the seven-unit maze.
This example with the rat is, of course, much less subtle than the filly's

Individual: Victory Charm**, chestnut mare foaled 1945. (Sire: Captain

mile west of Charleston Illinois, where Lincoln Avenue ended at I Street.
There was no track for harness work on the place. There was little traffic,
however on the road which ran a quarter-mile south from the stable and
then a q~arter mile west before turning south again down a steep hill. The
road was paved for only half its width, and the gravelled half on these two
comparatively level quarter-mile stretches was a pretty good place to
drive a colt hitched to an exercise cart. There was room to turn a cart
around at each end of each stretch as soon as the colt learned to move on
two-tracks--that is to walk sidewise in the shafts of the cart. Victory
Charm tended to ~xecute this movement too fast; furthermore, if she
thought she knew which way she was going to be asked to turn, she was
likely to turn before she received any signal from her driver. In other
words, she was one of those colts for whom it is especially important to
"keep the colt askin' questions".
.
At first, I alternated the direction of the turn, so that the filly would not
know what to expect until the signal came. This precaution soon became
inadequate. The filly would wait for dir_ectionsfor the first_time_she w~s
turned around during her workout, slowing down and wavering slightly in
the bridle to see what I was going to ask her to do. After that first turn,
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generalization about turning the jog cart, because the rat's environment
was drastically simplified, and a primitive motive for the learning was
provided. With the filly, Victory Charm, the only discernible motive was
the desire for sovereignty. She would much rather have complied with
what was expected of her because she knew it and chose to do it, than
because she was commanded to do it.
No. 17. Ella King** and the Psychotic Balk
Hypothesis: The nonverbal counterpart of the negation of a proposition is
an awareness incompatible with itself. (See discussion of negation in Part
Ill.)

Date: Winter 1947-48
Individual: Ella King**, chestnut mare foaled 1942. (Sire: Captain King;
dam: Ella Jean.)
Incident: This incident is uninterpretable
background.

without its historical

I bought Ella King as a physically sound but psychologically ruined
three-year-old in early summer 1945. She was a full sister to Jean Caprice
and Victory Charm, the yearling and weanling fillies produced by Ella
Jean under my ownership. For the research already beginning to shape
up, I wanted a granddaughter and a grandson of Ella Jean, one of them by
Pepper Martin, and the other by Hallmark Peavine. I had sold Jean
Caprice for enough to finance production of Victory Charm. The new foal
looked like a saleable individual also. Ella King seemed the most practical
prospect for a good broodmare of the same bloodlines. At that time I did
not know but what Captain King was just as important as Ella Jean in the
production of this strain of animal subjects.
I had observed Ella King from time to time since she was less than 24
hours old. I had seen her change from a responsive little filly who loved to
work for the man who bought her as a yearling and who did her best to
please him, into a psychotic wreck. In harness she would stand as if
paralyzed for a moment and then throw herself over backwards. Under
the saddle she would go into a trance and stop "stock-still", even from
vigorous forward motion. On these occasions, she would go into an
exaggerated show ring pose. Sometimes her owner (and rider) could bring
her out of this by shouting "Whoa!", and after a few seconds, saying "Get
Up!". No amount of punishment would move the mare when she was in
one of those trances. It was evident that it was not a matter of willful
contrariness. She was behaving as she did because she could not do
otherwise. I thought I knew what mistakes and accidents in her training
had produced this state of affairs, and I knew that they would not affect
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her offspring. Her stable manners were excellent, and she was very nice to
handle in the barn. So I bou~ht her for a broodmare, not counting on being
able to correct her psychosis. About a month after I bought Ella King, I
was disabled by an accident which kept me from carrying out any plans
for that year. The next August she was bred to Hallmark Peavine for a
July 1947 foal to be ready for observation when I returned from my 194647 sabbatical leave to be spent at the University of Chicago. (At the same
time, Ella Jean was bred to Pepper Martin to produce a second foal for
study the following summer.) These foals were both lost prematurely in
February and April 1947 while I was still in Chicago--both abortions
apparently the result of poor nutrition, poor care, and neglect. (I had also
lost Ella Jean's 1946 Hallmark Peavine foal, Mark Distinction, when he
was five days old.) After the 1947 abortion Ella Jean was never able to
produce a foal again. Ella King, however, was successfully bred to Pepper
Martin in May 1947. When I returned from the University of Chicago in
June, I found that the long vacation from saddle work seemed to have
made Ella King's trouble less acute. I began to try to school her and to try
to devise ways to bring her out of that sickening trance when she balked.
By autumn I had aquired a repertoire of things, each of which worked a
part of the time.
At this time, with the rather urgent encouragement of Charles Morris, I

was on the lookout for a behavioral interpretation of negation. It finally
occurred to me one day that I might accomplish the same thing by looking
for an awareness incompatible with itself, since for each proposition p, 'p
incompatible with p' is logically equivalent to 'not p'. There was at
Eastern Illinois University that fall a sophomore student named 'Doris
Mauntel', who was a good horseman and wanting to ride. One of her
academic instructors had referred her to me, and she frequently rode with
me. I found that Ella King was likely to freeze suddenly into her entranced balk when she was being worked at a brisk trot beside another
horse, if the other horse moved ahead of her the least bit. I knew that in
the fall of her two-year-old form, she had out-trotted every horse with
which she was ridden. I knew also that her owner had taught her to exert
heavy p~essure on the snaffle bit when she was trotting fast; she had a
mouth like a race horse's mouth, and her head carriage was like that of a
harness trotter instead of a horse of her own breed. There had been a lot
of loud, drugstore-cowboy shouting on those fast rides.
Later that fall the owner had tried to teach the filly to rack. To do this
he had put her in full bridle with a very tight curb chain on the curb bit'.
The filly was bewildered by pain when the man tried to "shake her" into a
slow rack. Her mouth and head carriage made it practically impossible for
her to. rack, anyway. Someone had told the man that you could throw a
horse mto a rack by getting it into a fast trot and then starting to shake it
on the curb bit. Up to that time, the curb bit had never been used for any
purpose except to stop the filly. The sudden curb pressure would bring the
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mare to a sliding stop. Whip, spurs, and shouts were used to try to make
her go forward against the bit. It was during these goings-on that the
psychosis developed. (The harness work trouble is another story and only
partially relevant.) Finally it occurred to me that Ella King might be
harboring awareness of two universal conditionals whose consequents
were contradictories. I knew that she had been taught the two
generalizations,
If I feel pressure on the curb bit then I am to stop.
If I am whipped or spurred then I am to go faster.

Confronted with a situation which represented the conjunction of
pressure on the curb bit with whip and spurs applied, what was the filly to
do? To stop and to go faster at the same time? Nature was providing a
defense that amounted to a temporary lapse of consciousness. The
situation was further complicated by the fact that when the mare began
to balk, her owner had ridden her beside another horse, hoping that her
training not to let herself be out-distanced would keep her going forward
when he tried to shake her into a rack. At long last I thought I had an
explanation of the balking spells when I was riding her with Miss Mauntel
mounted on the gelding, Star Lane Chief.
It occurred to me that I might be able to break up the pattern if I could
destroy one of the conflicting generalizations by counter-example. I asked
Miss Mauntel to try to bring Star also to a halt the instant the mare
stopped. The first time we succeeded in this, the mare gave a startled jerk,
like someone waking up suddenly. Both horses moved on simultaneously.
The mare soon began to diagnose her own symptoms of a coming attack
and to try to do something about it. I would feel her struggling under me
to break up incipient tensing of muscles. When she succeeded in averting
the attack she would become limp with relief and break into a sweat all
over. Of course, I always patted her on the neck and complimented her on
these occasions. Long before time for her foal to arrive the next April, she
was a delightful and a dependable pleasure ride. I even used her as a
pupil's mount for riding lessons while her foal, Indiana Moon, was a
suckling. (The little filly was left with her grandmother, Ella Jean, on
those occasions.)I sold Ella King in the summer of 1949, to a woman who
learned to ride her while Hoosier Beam was a suckling. The new owner
took the mare as soon as Hoosier Beam was old enough to wean. The mare
was later spoiled again by a man who was permitted to try riding her. (It
was not because he was a man; Ella King performed beautifully when
Glenn Bennett rode her in the fall of 1948 and early spring of 1949.) The
mare produced one more foal, a half-Standardbred filly, in 1941. The
owner moved to California the next fall and took the mare and filly with
her. The mare died soon after she reached California, but the filly, Merrie
King, made a fine pleasure mount, and still displays many of the winsome
and responsive characteristics of her mother's strain.
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Hypotheses Pertinent to Question IF
No. 18. An Early Foal Lesson for Non-Equine Adult Behavior
Hypothesis: If a foal young enough (and hence weak enough) to be held in
arms by a human handler is taught to relax and stop struggling in order to
obtain release, it may behave in a similarly non-equine manner in later
emergencies.
Individua/,s: Jean Caprice***, Pimworthy*, Victory Charm**, Indiana
Moon***.
Incidents: The lesson described in the hypothesis had been taught successfully to all these foals before they were 24 hours old.

A.Date: Autumn 1946
Jean Caprice**, then two years old, was being exercised in harness
by her owner, Ellen Nudd, at MacMurray College, Jacksonville,
Illinois. Miss Nudd was a horseman of limited experience. The
harness was old and weak. The bellyband broke and let the shafts fly
up over the filly's back, traces still attached. The filly stopped and,
though trembling, stood still to be unhitched.
B. Date: Spring 1947
Apparently the three-year-old filly Jean Caprice**, had kicked a
wide, low board out of her stall wall, and had then put her head
through the opening to investigate the empty stall adjoining hers.
Miss Nudd found her thus at feeding time, head fastened about a
foot above floor level. Miss Nudd went into the adjoining stall and
turned the filly's head with her hands until she found a position
from which it could be eased back through the hole. While in this
predicament the filly had not struggled at all. No broken skin; no
lost hair; no disarranged bedding.
C.Date: Last week of May 1945
Victory Charm**, about three weeks old, was found lying cast in her
stall. (A horse is said to be cast when it has rolled over toward a wall
with its legs pinned folded against its body and against the wall.
Horses tend to struggle violently in this position and often injure
themselves seriously.) She was scratching gently against the stall
wall with what little foot motion she could achieve. Otherwise she
was lying relaxed, her head flat on the bedding but pushed back so
that she could watch the door for the help she confidently expected.
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It was only her mother, Ella Jean, who was excited and worried. The
little filly kept herself limp while I pulled her away from the wall.
D. Date: Fall 1948; Summer 1950
Twice I saw Pimworthy* cast, once when he was a yearling and once
when he was a three-year-old. He was not relaxed to wait for help to
come, but he was calm and deliberate. He worked tediously and
carefully to free himself, groping carefully for a position and angle
of a hind foot against the wall which would enable him to exert a
little push. Each push would rotate his hind quarters away from the
wall an inch or two. Finally both hind feet were in position for a big
push against the wall. The shove carried him out to an angle that
enabled him to straighten his front legs for a push at that end. He
then came to his feet as a horse naturally gets up.

Mr. Hendrix led the mare back across the dangerous strip in a run.
As soon as they were safely across, the mare gave his coat sleeve a
comradely--perhaps congratulatory--little nip. The men remounted
and continued thei: r~de. Mr. Bundy's voice still grows husky with
wonder and apprec1at10nwhen he talks of Indiana Moon's behavior
on that occasion.
No. 19. Equine Infant Pleasure in Cross-SpeciesBodily Contact.
Hypothesis: Although there is no corresponding experience provided by
members of their own species, some foals who are taught the lesson
described in Hypothesis No. 18 learn to enjoy and to seek a kind of
protective bodily cuddling found only in species whose young are warmed
fed, groomed, and caressed in bodily contact.
'
Individuals: Victory Charm**, Mark Distinction**, Indiana Moon***,
Valjean MacDonald***, Count Down***.

E. Date: December 31, 1960
Indiana Moon**, then twelve years old, was being ridden on a thick
crust of ice over deep snow in the hills near Milford, New Hampshire, Mr. Benjamin Bundy up. With them was Mr. William L.
Hendrix mounted on Star Lane Chief, then 25 years old but still a
good ride. Mr. Hendrix owns both horses. Mr. Bundy, though
elderly, is a horseman of great skill and wide experience.
At one spot the riding trail was known to go over a small bridge that
had a hole in it. Mr. Hendrix and Mr. Bundy decided not to risk
having a horse's foot break through the crust into the invisible hole
in the bridge. Since the mare was the bolder animal of the two, it
was Mr. Bundy and Indiana Moon who went scouting to find another
way across the ravine. There was a small flowing stream under the
snow.
Suddenly the mare was lying top up with her belly resting on the
snow crust, not a leg in sight, and Mr. Bundy was stepping from
astride the mare, his feet already at ground level. The mare did not
move. When Mr. Hendrix got to her, he found only one foot, a hind
one, had gone through the crust. The other three were folded under
t~e mar~ on the snow. She did not seem to be in pain, but he worked
his arm mto the same hole with the leg, thinking it must be broken.
Instead he found the hoof and shoe caught in a fork of brush deep
under the snow. He worked the foot free with his hand. As soon as
t~e mare felt the foot come loose, she rose on the other three legs
with perfect muscular control and leaped clear of the ravine.
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Dates: May-June 1945; May 1946; April 1948--March 1950; May-August
1955; July 1960--June 1961. (For possible significance in relation to
Hypothesis 18, it should be noted that all five of these foals were among
those who had the relax-for-release lesson before they were twenty-four
hours old.)
Incidents: All of the individuals named above except Count Down had
the~r first taste of the mare's milk from a few drops milked into my hand.
Indiana Moon was also given an opportunity to suck some of it from a
bottle, but she would not use the rubber nipple. She seemed to know
where to find the source on the mare as soon as she had once tasted the
milk. (So did all the others.) Before tasting the milk from my hand the
hunt for food was a tantalizing trial-and-error process. Once a foai has
succeeded in getting to its feet, it is dangerous to allow it to drop back
down exhaus_ted_
before it gets its first nourishment. Many foals are lost
from never fmdmg the source of food. Even when milk is dripping from
the mare's udders, for most foals it is extremely difficult to locate it. I do
not know the explanation of the sudden "knowledge" that a first taste of
the mare's milk produces--guidanceby odor, perhaps.
Each ?f these foals had ~lso had a taste of sugar from my hand--only a
few grams to melt on their tongues--before they were forty-eight hours
old.
Victory Charm**, Mark Distinction* *, Indiana Moon***, and Valjean
MacDonald***, all liked to lie with their heads in my lap or curled up
against me by the time they were two days old. It took a week to develop a
taste for it in Count Down***, possibly because I was five hours late in
becoming acquainted with him. I saw the others before their mothers saw
them. In fact, I delivered Victory Charm and Valjean MacDonald.
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(Valjean MacDonald was Victory Charm's first foal. Things were complicated by a dead mummified twin. The filly, however was an excellent
prospect. I sold her before she was six weeks old for a show prospect. A
blemish from an injury received a few weeks later changed her potential
future. She was resold at weaning time and taken to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, the next year. I have lost track of her.) There are photographs of
this behavior for Victory Charm and Count Down.
Ella Jean and Ella King were always watchful--perhaps apprehensive-during these incidents with their foals, but Victory Charm, who had
behaved in the same way when she was a foal, "thought nothing of it"
when it was done to her own foals Valjean MacDonald and Count Down.
Furthermore, Victory Charm allowed others to handle her foals in the
same way.
Helen Wallace, the caretaker for Victory Charm and Count Down from
August 1960 to March 1961, reported having one of these sessions with
Count Down every morning until he was weaned. When I saw the colt the
last week in November 1960, he was lying on the ground, loose out-of.
doors. He stayed there while I squatted beside him and petted him. He
also tried to push me down so that he could put his head in my lap.
Shortly after the colt was weaned in December, he was frightened and
injured by the veterinarian who tried to give him medicine for parasites.
The reclining behavior was not re-activated until June, 1961.
At that time a new caretaker--John Winings, a university student with
no previous experiences with horses-spent four eight-hour days within
sight and hearing of the colt, talking to him and trying to go into the stall
each time the yearling colt lay down. Finally, on the third day the colt
remained down until Mr. Winings got down on the bedding at the colt's
head. After one or two apprehensive starts to rise, the colt relaxed and
put his head and neck in the usual place in Mr. Wining's lap. He soon
began to make the sounds reported in No. 9.
Valjean MacDonald*** was the most "cuddly" of these foals, and she
seemed to love everybody. Mark Distinction did not live long enough for
follow-up observations. (He was a fine, healthy foal, lost by a caretaker's
neglect during complications traceable to a veterinary blunder during the
colt's delivery.)
The reclining-for-caressing behavior continued in Indiana Moon until
the spring of her two-year-old form. During these sessions with her, she
always hummed. It is quite possible that the behavior could be reactivated by patience and careful stage-setting.
Foals who received the same early teaching without displaying this
behavior were Jubilee Charm**, a Hackney half-bred daughter of Victory
Charm foaled in 1957, and Cinema Sal8,one of the foals used for the films
in 1959. I worked with her dam, Blanchita Martin*, for six weeks
preparatory to handling the newborn foal. Although she was never
threatening in my presence, she always tried to put herself between me
and the foal when it was lying down. If I tied up the mare or had someone
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else to hold her, the foal popped to its feet before I could get down to it-•
normal equine behavior.
In the case of Jubilee Charm I had complete cooperation from the mare,
and I handled the little filly as I did the others the night she was foaled.
By the next morning, however, she was all horse by instinct. I tried on
five days during her first week, but she would never allow me to get to her
while she was down. I disposed of her as a three-year-old, since her only
value for the research seemed to lie in the illustration of contrast to individuals of the purebred strain.
None of this routine except the relax-for-release lesson was carried out
with Hoosier Beam***. (I was busy with other urgent things in May
1949.)

REFERENCES
1.

In more formal language:
For each of my positions x on the trail, if x is a level stretch with a
hill at the far end of it, then xis a place where I am permitted to
canter.
I wish to emphasize that we are not here "putting words into the
horse's mouth". We are referring to an awareness which man and
horse can share but which only man can verbalize.

2.

Historical sketch of Marshall Martin.
I bought this horse as a coming-two-year-old in early spring 1940.
He had been ridden six times and hitched once. I selected him from
three Pepper Martin colts of the same age, all of good conformation
and motion, by riding each of them for about fifteen minutes. Since
it was to be my first experience at working with a horse that young,
and working with one that had not previously been "spoiled" in some
way, I was especially concerned with being able to predict the
animal's temperament. This colt displayed a combination of stability
and alert responsiveness which made me decide in his favor. It was
my idea to develop the colt into a mount suitable for a young
amateur in time to sell him without loss, thus paying expenses for
the experience and observations I hoped to get through working
with one that did not have to be ''made over".
The colt had been raised at an excellent breeding farm. He had
been taught to lead as a weanling, and handled at regular intervals
for parasite treatment, foot trimming, and grooming. However, he
had been worked for less than two weeks. The morning I bought
him, after seeing him driven two laps on a small indoor track, I
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drove the colt hitched to a cart. I did not know until several years
later that that morning was the first time that the colt had ever been
hitched. I had driven a horse in harness less than a dozen times in
my life before that morning.
The colt's development went well, and I sold him the following
September to a fourteen-year-old girl, who rode him for the next
three years but had very little success with him in the show ring.
The colt was sent to a professional trainer for formal show ring
training in the spring of his three-year-old form, and he came back
unfit for the girl to control.
When the owner left home for college in the fall of 1943, I bought
back the horse and re-trained him. His original patterns of behavior,
obedience, and dependability returned quickly. Later that winter I
sold him for the mount of a thirteen-year-old girl who was a riding
pupii of mine. She progressed beautifully with the horse, and they
made quite a name for themselves in amateur and horsemanship
classes at horse shows during the next two seasons. During this time
the horse was quartered in my part of the Fairgrounds stable and
cared for under my supervision.
In the fall of 1945 the girl's parents moved to a home which had a
small adjoining pasture, and the next spring the horse was let down
and allowed to run free and graze during the early spring. It was at
this time that the mischievous ingenuity of his personality began to
show itself, and it was during that spring that the incident reported
in connection with Hypothesis 6 occurred. (See "Marshall Martin
and the Water Hydrant.")
The horse has continued to be something of a "character". He was
later sold to Mrs. Paul Newman, Charleston, Illinois, for a pleasure
mount, and at my last word of him during the summer of 1962, he
was an entertaining pet, still a "good ride", and still coming up with
new ideas.
3.

This movement eludes verbal description. It should be filmed for
several foals, so that it can be studied carefully in comparison to
later motion in play.

4.

Tervoort, Rev. Fr. Bernard T., S.J. "Esoteric Symbolism in the
Communication Behavior of Young Deaf Children." American
Annals of the Deaf, November, 1961, Vol.106, No. 5, 436-480

5.

The fact that the mare's foal was in my hands may have provided an
urgent motive for her trying to think of something to allay my
anger. The mare may have been concerned for the little filly's safety.
Do there exist in the learning of nonlinguistic mammals, kinds of
awareness that can be identified with each of the formative symbols

6.
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(logical connectives) of language?
7.

To what extent is the capacity of an individual to make such a
"breakthrough" due
1) to early experience of the individual (from birth to six weeks
in the mammals to be used in this study)?
2) to hereditary traits within an intensified strain of the
species?

8.

Cinema Sal* and Cinema Kate*, the two 1959 foals whose behavior
was filmed for Production III of the NETRC MATH STUDY, were
both taught the lesson described in Hypothesis 18. We have excellent film coverage of the lesson to Cinema Kate. There has been
no opport~nit_y~oobserye possible consequences of the experience in
those two md1v1duals,sm~e they were borrowed for the film making
and then returned to their owner. Both are still alive on the farm
where they were bred. Neither has been trained. Both of them
should be obtained for continuation of this research if possible. So
should their dams if they are still able to produce foals. The dams
are full sisters, sire: Pepper Martin, dam: a full sister to Hallmark
Peavine. The sire of the two 1959 foals is out of the same mare as
Count Down's sire.
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PARTID
Semantic Referents for Logical
Constants-A Genetic Theory of
the Nature of Language
PARTIII is my first attempt to organize the theory that was beginning to
take form when ''Prerequisite to Meaning"1 was written. The set of
hypotheses presented not only provides an explanation of human nonverbal communication at the same time that it explicates older theories of
animal learning; it also opens up a new approach to a hitherto frustrating
problem of linguistics. Regarding generalizing as primarily a nonverbal
process (See Part II, Hypotheses 1, 2, 3.) permits--and requires!--a reexamination of the semantical nature of logical constants. These constants are the connectives and other formators essential to a language
structure. If it turns out that we can identify each logical constant with
some kind of awareness, then we shall be much closer to an explanation of
intuitive thought and the processes of discovery.
The English language, for example, contains symbols such as the 'is' in the
sentence:
["the 'is' of predication"]
Lassie is canine.
and the 'is' in:
["the 'is' of set membership"]
Lassie is a dog.
and the 'is' in:
["the 'is' of identity"]
The star nearest Earth is the sun.
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There are also symbols such as 'not', 'if-then', 'and', and 'or'; and symbols
which express universality such as 'all', 'every', 'each', 'always'; and
symbols which express existence such as the 'there is' and the 'some' in the
sentences:
There is an Earth satellite which is not man-made.
and:
Some Earth satellites are not man-made.
It is well to note that the 'is' of identity is the only one of the English 'is's
which is a synonym for the mathematical symbol,'='·
Sometimes a predicate is combined with a logical connective. For
example, replacing 'and' by 'but' expresses conjunction with contrast;
'because' has a similar dual function. The universal quantifier for a
conditional generalization is frequently hidden in sentences incorporating
still another use of 'is'--the one which Kelly2 classifies as the 'is' of subclassification.
For example:
A dog is a quadruped.
is an abbreviation for:

\_J

Yx

if x is a dog then x is a quadruped.

or:
The set of all x such that x is a dog is a subset
of the set of all x such that x is a quadruped.
There has been much theoretical speculation and controversy over the
nature of such linguistic symbols. During the last forty years, most
philosophers of language have disposed of the problem by considering
these symbols as having no referential content. All, however, agree that
these symbols--at least some of them--are essential to a communication
system that can be classified as language. For example, nearly two
decades ago Charles Morris wrote:
"...the signs in a language must constitute a system of interconnected signs combinable in some ways and not in
others ..."3
In the same book Morris states:
"We now mention one of the most difficult topics in semiotic:
the interpretation of what are often called 'logical signs' or
'formal signs' or 'syncategorematic signs', terms which various
authors apply to such features of language as 'or', 'not', 'some',
'is','+', 'five', variables, word order, suffixes, parts of speech,
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grammatical structure, punctuation devices, and the like. Here
differences of opinion run riot: There is no agreement as to
which terms belong to the intended class, whether these terms
are properly regarded as signs, and if they are signs, whether
they are designators, appraisors, prescriptors or signs in a
distinctive mode of signifying."•
In his chapter, "Formators and Formative Discourse", Morris again
writes:
"The reader should be warned at the outset that we are dealing
with the most debatable issue in the whole field of science of
signs."6

Many of the items in Morris' list are now considered clearly referential. In
prevailing philosophy o.f mathematics, numbers are entities denoted by
numerals; mathematical operations are relations, which can be regarded
extensionally as sets of ordered pairs; the nature of variables has received
detailed treatment in philosophy of mathematics since the above
quotations were written. (See Gertrude Hendrix, "Variable Paradox, A
Dialogue in One Act"11) In the present discussion, study is concentrated on
the nature of the constants listed in the last paragraph of page 63 and the
first paragraph of page 64, and one additional connective, I. M. Sheffer's 1
stroke "function",'/', pronounced in English as 'is incompatible with'. It
should be pointed out that a communication system composed of signals,
or composed of nonlinguistic symbols, cannot be changed into a language
without at least one of these formative symbols. In other words, without
at least one logical constant, Hockett's 8 criterion of productivity cannot be
fulfilled.
I propose the that hypothesis that each of these logical constants expresses--that is, names-a kind of awareness. Extensionally, each of them
can be regarded as a name of a set. Let us first consider the 'is' of
predication (or its logical equivalent the 'is' of set membership). Consider
an organism which has seen or felt, and remembered individual objects,
and has observed or experienced individual events. Suppose further that
the organism is aware of at least one concept, that is, at least one
existential generalization. (See Part II, Hypothesis 3.) This last means
that the organism is aware of at least one set of objects or events. Such a
set is the kind of entity which is named by a common noun, or whose
selecting property may be named by an adjective or a conjunction of
adjectives. From the moment of such an awareness, the organism can
recognize everything it perceives as belonging to that set or not belonging
to it. Suppose also that the organism is sufficiently high in the communication system hierarchy to have symbols which name individuals
and symbols which name sets. (This stage of development is clearly
recognizable in Tervoort's study of young deaf children. 9 ) Such an
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organism, upon recognizing that an individual belongs to a set of which
the organism is itself aware, would be quite capable of producing the
name of the individual and the name of the set "juxtaposed" in time or
space. As a matter of fact, almost every normal child goes through this
stage of quasi sentence-making, leaving unsymbolized his awareness of
the set membership. Such attempts to communicate are successful only
when the receiver infers from context the referent of the missing symbol.
I propose the hypothesis that the invention of this first logical constant is
the crossover to /,anguage. Up to the moment, expression is restricted to
nonlinguistic processes. I further propose the hypothesis that the 'is' of
predication or set membership is the name of a set of ordered pairs. This
connective is sometimes called the 'is' of classification. Since Lassie is a
dog, we know that the ordered pair (Lassie, dog) belongs to the set of
ordered pairs denoted by this 'is'. Similarly, (Lassie, canine) belongs to the
set denoted by this kind of 'is'.
Does (Annie Rooney, boy) belong to this set? [No.]
Does (the White House, white) belong to it? [Yes.]
Does (dog, quadruped) belong to it? [No.]
Does (dog, species) belong to it? [Yes.]
Does (blue, color) belong to it? [Yes.]
Does (the Blue Room, color) belong to it? [No.]
Does (the Blue Room, blue) belong to it? [Yes.]
Does (Martha Washington, wife of George Washington) belong to it?
[No.]
Does (Martha Washington, wife of a president) belong to it? [Yes.]
The simple but subtle leap to inventing a symbol for awareness of set
membership is an advance of explosive dimensions. No earthly species
except the human race has ever achieved it; and every known tribe of
human beings, however primitive, has possessed this instrument. Indeed,
it may not be too much to suggest that this breakthrough marked the
beginning of Homo sapiens. The nature of symbol suggested in Part Il,
Hypotheses 12, 13, implies that this kind of communication activity,
which could grow by leaps and bounds as soon as the first breakthrough
occurred, would increase the deductive experience of an individual by an
almost astronomical ratio. A sender deduces from referent to symbol; a
receiving interpreter deduces from symbol to referent. The members of a
group who could "catch on" to such a new activity would soon form their
own society, ostracizing the individuals who were too stupid to play the
game. This selectivity, coupled with increasing cerebral exercise in each
generation, might well lead to increased size and quality of the brain in
succeeding generations.

Until the incident of Indiana Moon's referential hum (See Part II, Incident
10.) I had thought that the evolu~ionar~ breakthrough of greatest
magnitude in this field would be the mvenbon of names. I had thought
this because a symbol that names an individual or a set is a much more
subtle thing than a signal. A signal functions _asa 01:e-word ~en_ten_ce.
Subject, verb, and predicate---:frequently combmed with a bmlt-m imperative-are well wrapped up m one sound, or gesture, or mark on a treP,
or sequence of smoke puffs. Dogs, cats, h?rses:-members ~f many
mammal species-can learn to use such devices m cross-spec1_escommunication, and there is evidence that some of them, and many birds, use
such signals for communication with their o~ kind_.A name is a _much
more subtle thing. But even far, far beyond mvent10n of names 1s the
crucial introduction of an asserting connective.
Consider an organism that has arrived at the use of "juxtaposition" of
symbol sounds or gestures to indicat~ that something bel~ngs to ~ certam
set (or that something has a certam property). One might thmk that
inventing an asserting connective would follow easily and natur~lly. Such
a connective would merely denote an awareness as yet unverbalized, that
is an awareness which the sender tries to express by "juxtaposition".
Many normal children proceed quickly from the juxtaposition stage of
talk to actual sentence formation. But it appears now that this seemingly
facile advance must be an adaptation of sounds heard in adult conversation but not hitherto noticed. In the extensive recorded observations
of communication behavior of deaf children in Tervoort's 10 research, there
is no recognized instance of such progress. In the most advanced untaught
communcation behavior of these Dutch or American children, many
misunderstandings arose due to their lack of syntax. When two or more of
their symbolic signs used consecutively resulted in confusion to the
receiver, the sender often resorted to supplementary mimicry. Frequently
the result was frustration; either the sender abandoned the communication attempt, or the receiver unknown to the sender at the time
was left with an impression different from that intended by the sender.
Yet the sender was quite evidently "thinking" the thing that might have
been expressed by an appropriate logical constant. When some of these
same children were observed later under formal instruction, they quickly
learned to solve the problem by using the grammatical connectives taught
to them by their teachers. One would be tempted to conclude that this
part of the language has always had to be taught, were it not ~or !he
question of how such symbols came to be a part of a commumcabon
system in the first place. Somewhere, sometime, the breakthrough was
made. It may yet be re-enacted in the on-going research with deaf
children.
I digress to point out that no such immensity is expected from any of the
equine subjects in the animal behavior study outlined in this proposal. It
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is expected (1) that cross-species equine use of signals will be identified,
and it is hoped that (2) some examples of mimetic expressors converted
into symbols can be evoked and recorded. These two kinds of events will
be studied for their place in an evolutionary development of communication behavior. The next two great steps-(3) quasi sentence formation by juxtaposition of names, and (4) invention of at least one connective to refer to a corresponding awareness-these are beyond the scope
of the experimentation in this study. [In my opinion they also are beyond
any forseeable ability of the animal subjects to be used. The research staff
will try not to allow skepticism to blind them to significant incidents
which may occur, trusting to sound tape and film to preserve events of no
immediately recognized significance, so that they will be available to
others for open-minded and detached study.]
The Conditional
We turn now to the interpretation of a propositional connective, 'if-then'.
As with the 'is' of set membership, I regard this logical constant as a name
of a set of ordered pairs. This time, however, the components of the ordered pairs are propositions. This interpretation requires a reexamination of what we mean by the word 'proposition'. For purposes of
scientific discourse it is helpful to think of statements as sentences which
can be classified as true or false. (That is, we rule out value judgements,
imperatives, questions, open sentences, nonsensical sequences of words,
etc.) A proposition is usually thought of as a set of all statements, each
two of which mean the same thing. For the time being, let's say that a
proposition is denoted by each of its member statements. This implies
that the meaning of a statement is the proposition to which it belongs.
Given a pair of statements, many people find it difficult to decide whether
the first statement belongs to the same proposition as the second or to
another proposition whose member-statements are derivable from the
second. For example, most persons would say that the statement:
Urbana is east of Champaign.
belongs to the same proposition as:
The direction from Champaign to Urbana is east.
Some would also say that the sentence:
Champaign is west of Urbana.
belongs to the same proposition as the first; others would say it belongs to
another proposition whose member statements are derivable from the
first together with at least one other premise-for example, a premise
about the relationship between east and west. No one would argue that:
Urbana is in Illinois.
means the same thing as the first statement. This one obviously belongs
to another proposition. Let us assume, for present purposes, that such
decisions about meaning can be made. Now let us examine the notion of a
proposition as a set of all statements which mean the same thing.
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Question: What is it that enables one to classify statements into
propositions? Some maintain that any sample statement of a proposition
can be used as a "selector" for the set. All one has to do is to imagine a big
box filled with slips of paper, each with a statement written on it. As one
proceeds with sorting these slips into piles of statements according to the
propositions they denote, he simply starts a new pile every time he comes
to a statement that does not "mean the same thing as" those already in
one of the piles. We get along all right with this "sample statement"
answer until we consider a sorter who is someone with a new idea.
Suppose he is one of those scientists who find verbal formulation difficult.
Suppose he does not know yet whether his new idea is new for everyone.
Although he has no sample sentence, he does have something which
enables him to reject every statement as he searches through the box.
What is this "something"?
Next question: How is at least one sample statement for a discoverer's
new idea ever to get into the box?
The "sample statement" answer to the selector problem evokes the picture
of a machine drawing copies of nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc., from
pigeonholes, and fitting them into a sentence-structure pattern, with the
discoverer watching for the first statement which expresses his discovery.
A comparable picture is that of the discoverer examining the papers
produced by the often-mentioned million monkeys typing on a million
typewriters. We know such considerations to be absurd as soon as we
think about them. The verbalization of a new idea just does not happen in
that way. The words are not drawn at random from pigeonholes. The first
statement of a new propostion is some person's formulation of what had
been until that moment his own unverbalized awareness. Let us grant
that frequently during the formulation effort the awareness may be
changed, revised, refined. But that first sample statement is not complete
until it is in consonance with the awareness that is in the composer's
mind. Furthermore, no other person has actually read that sentence until
an interpretation has produced within him the same awareness. Although
rules of syntax within the same language, or rules of translation to other
languages, may be used to identify other members of the set of statements
which belong to the new proposition, I propose that we consider the
fundamental, intrinsic selector of the set to be the awareness expressed by
each of the member statements. However dubious this may seem, let us
entertain the hypothesis long enough to see where it leads.

We are still not ready, however, to tell what 'if-then' denotes until we
recognize properties of unverbalized awarenesses which correspond to
truth and falsity for statements. It might be better to use different words
for these corresponding properties of awareness, but for the present
purpose let us say that an awareness is true if any statement which expresses it is true, and that an awareness is false if any statement which
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expresses it is false.
The way is now open for us to say that 'if-then' denotes the set of ordered
pairs of propositions which is the complement [with respect to the set of
all ordered pairs of propositions] of the set of ordered pairs of propositions
in which the first is true and the second false. This implies that the
conditional is a relation whose domain is the set of all propositions. To
obtain a member pair for the relation, one may select any proposition
whatever for the first component. If it turns out that he has selected a
false proposition, he then has complete freedom in selection of the second
component of the member pair. If the selection for first component is a
true proposition, then one can complete the member pair only by selecting
another true proposition for the second component. Another way of
saying all this is to say that the conditional (that is, if-then) is the union of
the set of all ordered pairs of propositions in which both components are
true, the set of all ordered pairs of propositions in which both are false,
and the set of all ordered pairs of propositions in which the first is false
and the second is true. 11 (For a plausible approach to the concept of
conditionality see Reference 11.)
Although this organization of experience into awareness and ordered
pairs of awarenesses is characteristic of very early and very primitive
learning, the becoming aware of categories of ordered pairs of
propositions is a more subtle and elusive thing. Legal experts speak of the
rarity with which witnesses can distinguish between what they know by
direct evidence and what they know by inference. In all such cases the
reasoning is taking place on a nonverbal level, and the result is verbalized
as something the witness thinks he knows by experience or direct observations.
When awareness of a conditional is not accompanied by awareness of a
generalization of which the conditional is an instance, it is doubtful
whether the conditional corresponds to anything more complicated than
memory of a pair of events ordered by the relation, before. (Another kind
of example is an intention to carry out two actions in a chosen temporal
order.) There seems to be some kind of neural potential which can
organize several of these time-ordered pairs into the kind of neuro
dynamo which operated as a universally quantified conditional. It seems
there must be some kind of physical change (electrical? chemical? electrochemical?) corresponding to each new awareness of an "all-ness"or "everyness". (The set of all such awarenesses is denoted by the universal
quantifier. For another example and a more detailed discussion of this
point, see Reference 12.) It is as if something similar in each of several
experiences had deposited an electric charge on the same neural location;
and as if accumulating related examples had built an increasing "charge",
something that finally became capable of producing a spark of its own.
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Conditionals of this kind produce predictions and explanations on an
insight level. Hence, the speculations expressed above provide a way for
analyzing intuitive thought.
Assigning so basic and primitive a learning role to the formation of
universal conditional generalizations does not minimize the subtlety of
the process. Acquiring and using such awarenesses is a long way from a
sophisticated awareness of the process within oneself. An awareness of
the existence of this kind of ordered pairs of awarenesses is what an
organism would have to acquire before it could be impelled to invent a
linguistic symbol for the relation. The simplest cases, no doubt, are those
of subsethood, but even these are not easy. Intellectually it is a long way
from 'Lassie is a dog.' to 'If Lassie is a dog, then Lassie is a quadruped.'.
What happened anthropologically was use of the form, 'A dog is a
quadruped.'. The traditional use of the same word, 'is', for so different a
meaning testifies to the subtlety of the distinction.
Alternation, Conjunction, and Incompatibility
As soon as we have achieved a referential interpretation of one such
logical constant, the others come easily. The alternation symbol 'or'
denotes the complement of the set of ordered pairs of propositions in
which both components are false. More direct but also more complicated
is the following description: Alternation (sometimes called 'disjunction') is
the union of the set of ordered pairs of propositions in which both components are true, the set in which the first component is true and the
second is false, and the set in which the first component is false and the
second is true. This relation is denoted in English by the inclusive 'or'. In
symbolic logic the most common name for alternation is the wedge, 'v'.
Conjunction is the set of ordered pairs of propositions in which both
components are true. This relation is usually denoted in English by 'and';
in symbolic logic by the dot (as in 'p•q'), the upside down wedge, or the
ampersand, '&'. It is interesting to note that conjunction is a subset of
both alternation and conditionality; in other words, it is a subset of the
intersection of the set, if-then, and the set, or.

The incompatibility relation holds for all ordered pairs of propositions
except those in which both components are true. In other words, the
incompatibility relation is the complement of conjunction. In symbolic
logic it is named by the stroke, '/', and is pronounced as 'is incompatible
with'. Although it is used comparatively little in symbolic logic, the
importance of the incompatibility relation for this study is crucial.
Negation
For a long time the quest for an extensional interpretation of logical
constants as a possible clue to intuitive thought (that is, nonverbal
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thought) seemed futile because of the crucial role played by negation in
language. At first, negation did indeed seem to be a metalinguistic
concept, a property of sentences, something incapable of behavioral interpretation. It seemed that any proposition harbored on the awareness
level must operate only as if it were true. A false unverbalized awareness
apparently cannot be identified as false by the organism afflicted with it.
For a given organism, the proposition is there or not there. It must be
harbored, put up with, lived with as best the organism can manage, unless
the awareness can be destroyed by experiences of counter-example. It
seems that such destruction on a nonverbal level cannot be accomplished
by negation. Whatever corresponds to negation on the unverbalized
awareness level, it is not something to which an organism can resort to
detach itself from a false awareness, in the same way that a linguistic
being can sometimes discard a false awareness by achieveing its verbalization and inserting a 'not'. The explanation for this problem may lie
in the fact that a proposition incompatible with itself is logically
equivalent to the negation of that proposition. That is: is logically
equivalent to:
~p

The two sentence forms above have the same truth table. 11 With the clue
provided by this equivalence, and with a suitable subject fortunately at
hand, it became easy to identify the behavioral evidence of an organism
trying to harbor an awareness which is incompatible with itself. If 'p' is
true then 'p/p' is false. If 'p' is false then 'p/p' is true. For a description of
the incident from which this hypotheses emerged, see Part II, Incident 17.
Merely trying to contemplate the mental state of harboring an awareness
which is incompatible with itself is maddening and painful. Neural tissue
apparently cannot cope with this situation. As soon as this diagnosis for
the mental paralysis which accompanies such a "state of mind" is accepted
(a paralysis which is sometimes physical also), no further experimentation
is needed to provide examples. The vast accumulation of neurosisproducing experiments performed on dogs, cats, sheep, and other species,
provide an appalling supply of verifications, all of which could have been
predicted a priori from the incompatibility hypothesis developed above.
There is no escape from such a state for an organism which does not
possess language, no power of detachment from an awareness which
cannot "live with itself'. Human beings, as well as nonlinguistic species,
are subject to acquiring these pairs of conflicting awarenesses. This is
especially true of small children at pre-language age. This hypothesis
concerning the nature of negation may provide new insight into many
incipient mental illnesses.

Identity
. wh.1ch belongs to th e 1.dentity
• re1a t·10n1s
• one m
• wh.1ch th e
An ordered parr
first and second components are both the same entity. The comp~ments
may be an individual, a set, or even a relation. The urge to symbolize the
identity relation accompanies recognition of a pair which belongs to it.
Some of he earliest quasi sentences of little children are expressive of such
an awareness. A costume accident may bring forth, "Santa Claus Daddy!".
A deaf child without speech could have the same awareness unexpressed
or possibly, expressed by pantomime. Even so, awareness that a first set
~d a second set belong to the identity relation is a still more subtle experience than awareness of predication or subsethood. I believe it usually
comes through discovering the intersection of two sets. Such a contemplation of the set of all mammals and the set of all bipeds is a case in
point. The set of all mammals who walk upright turns out to be the same
as the set of all bipeds without feathers. The categorized domain from
which we get the subset of mammals is different from the categorized
domain from which we get a set of featherless bipeds, but one category
from each domain turns out to be the same set. To express such an
awareness one must have a connective such as 'is identical to', 'is the same
as', or '='. Because this formator, like the one for predication or set
membership, is one of those needed early in the development of language,
and because it also is first expressed by almost all of us by context in a
connectionless utterance-possibly because of these things-it is one of
the most difficult to grasp. Incorrect examples of the 'is' of identity are
prevalent in the literature on this subject. There are many examples
which appear in treatises and articles on the philosophy of language that
are otherwise quite learned. The most recent example I have seen appeared in an article on the Oxford school of philosophical thought. In the
journalist's report of an interview, we fmd:
"... He simply says there are two different types of 'is'es-one of
predication and one of identity. The first asserts a quality; 'This is
white.' The second points to the object named: 'This is a house.'"14
Neither of the 'is's mentioned above is the 'is' of identity. The second one
is what logicians call 'the epsilon 'is' '-that is, the 'is' of set membership.
A similar sentence which does contain the 'is' of identity is:
This is the White House.
Mr. Mehta's examples are both the same kind of 'is'. As far as logical
syntax is concernced, saying that x belongs to the set of white things
requires the same sentence form as saying that x belongs to the set of
houses. The 'is' of identity is a connective which asserts that two expressions denote the same entity-that is, name the same thing.
Existence
I propose the hypothesis that becoming aware of an existential
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generalization is the same thing as acquiring a concept. Awareness of a
set entails awareness of some categorizing property by which one can
separate his universe into entities that belong to the set and entities that
do not belong. Such an awareness sometimes develops to fulfill the need
for a new generalization applicable to some immediate problem. We have
a case of this in Part II, Incident 3. Although Star Lane Chief had been
thrown in to a rack several times by his previous trainer, he had never
become aware of what his feet were doing. There had been nothing in the
experience pattern to help the animal to notice that common element. As
far as the horse's awareness was concerned, that way of going might as
well not have existed. I see no difference here between acquiring
awareness of the existence of such a way of going, and acquiring the
concept.
It is important for theory of instruction to know that the process of
concept formation frequently is completed to provide antecedents for
instances of a universal conditional generalization whose consequent set
is something desirable. (See Part II, Hypothesis 3.) It does not always
happen in this way, however. The excited two-year old boy who called out,
"Boy car-car!", when he first saw a boy on a bicycle probably was expressing awareness of an existential generalization that had come to him
at that moment. Notice that here we have a fourth logical constant basic
to language structure but unsymbolized in the child's quasi sentence. This
brings us to another hypothesis: It is because predication (or set membership), identity, subsethood, and existence are all four expressed by
juxtaposition of words in earlier stages of language development, that all
four are expressed by the same word in almost every language. The
connectionless quasi sentences in primitive speech all had the same form.
What could be more natural than to use whatever symbol is invented for
one of them to serve the purpose of all four? Just as the adjective-like use
of numerals kept the nature of natural number hidden for thousands of
years, so the over-worked present indicative singular of the copulative
verb has obscured the structure of language. It is only with the separation
of these logical connectives as revealed by the development of symbolic
logic that analyzing the nature of awareness becomes possible.
Logical Equivalence
We have already mentioned (Part II, Hypothesis 15,) the fact that there
seems to be no confusion of conditionals with their converses on the
unverbalized awareness level. Equally impressive is the evidence that
awareness of some propositions carries with it awareness of logically
equivalent propositions. (See Part II, Hypothesis 16.) I do not know yet
whether this coexistence is limited to instances of universal
generalizations of which the organism is aware. There is no such
limitation on linguistic manipulation to obtain statements logically
equivalent to a given one. For example, consider:
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If my new hat is here then I am going to the tea.
I am confident that a woman can be acting upon such an awaren~ss
without verbalizing it, even to herself. But whether this awareness mcludes (without further thought or mental effort) the nonverbal counterpart of:
If I'm not going to the tea then my new hat is not here.
is another question. Some other sentences 15 logically equivalent to this
one are:
My new hat is not here, or I am going to the tea.
I am going to the tea, or my new hat is not here.
It is not the case that my new hat is here and I am not going to the
tea.
My new hat being here is incompatible with my not going to the tea.
I believe, however, that if one such sentence expresses an instance of a
universal generalization of which an organism is aware, then awareness of
the nonverbal counterparts of all the others is there also. (See Part II,
Hypothesis 16.) The o~~inal sen!e~ce in th~ exa~ple above is an instance
of a universally quantified conditional which might be stated somewhat
as follows:
I always go to tea if I have a new hat.
or:
If I have a new hat when there is a tea to which I am invited, then I
go to the tea.
More formally, the generalization may be stated:
For each tea x to which I am invited, if there exists y such that y is
my new hat, then I go to x.

If our hypothetical lady is subverbally committed to the generalization
and hence is applying the generalization at the time, my conjecture is that
the awarenesses expressed by all the logically equivalent sentences are
also present. But if the original intention is an isolated case-a decision
for that occasion only-I doubt that the logically equivalent awarenesses
are available to the lady without verbal formulation, logical manipulation
of the sentence, and interpretation of the resutls.
Biconditionality
The biconditionality connective, 'if and only if, sometimes abbreviated
'ifr, and usually replaced by •~or•=;
in symbolic logic, is the union
of the set of ordered pairs of propositions in which both components are
true, and the set of ordered pairs of propositions in which both components are false. This relation is a subset of conditionality, and a much
more highly restricted set. Each biconditional sentence is logically
Semantic Referents 75

equivalent to the conjunction of two conditionals, each the converse of the
other. For example:
A triangle has two congruent sides
if and only if
it has two congruent angles.
is logically equivalent to:
If a triangle has two congruent sides then it has two congruent
angles, and if a triangle has two congruent angles then it has two
congruent sides.
Although on the surface it seems that the biconditional can be considered
adequately through conjunction of conditionals, I strongly suspect that on
an unverbalized awareness level the conjunction of two converse conditionals is neurologically different from the coexistence of two conditionals not so related. Although I have pointed out that a conditional
which has not been verbalized is not confused with its converse, the fact
remains that an organism learns much more readily a conditional of
whose converse the organism is previously aware. (See Part II Hypothesis
15.) It has also seemed to me that a biconditional is a much more rigid and
inflexible kind of learning on an unverbalized awareness level than are
conditionals. Awareness of conditionals is destructible by counterexample. Awareness of biconditionals is much more resistant. I have no
idea how this question might be investigated, but when the creative
ingenuity of an experimental scientist in ethology is brought to bear upon
it, this question may become accessible to investigation.
Completeness
To establish a nonverbal counterpart to logical linguistic discourse, we
would have needed nonverbal counterparts for no more than four logical
constants: one of them must name negation; another could be a symbol for
either conditionality, alternation, or conjunction; the third might be
either the universal quantifier or the existential quantifier; and of course
there must be a predication or set membership formator. [Every universal
conditional generalization is logically equivalent to the negation of an
existential generalization, and every existential generalization is logically
equivalent to the negation of a universal; hence only one quantifier is
necessary.] Still more startling for our purpose, however, is Nicod's16
accomplishment with Sheffer's stroke function. Nicod found that he could
derive the entire system of propositional logic from only one logical
constant, only one primitive sentence, and only one rule of inference, if
for his primitive constant he used the stroke-that is, a symbol for incompatibiltiy. In the Russel-Bernays development of the propositional
calculus there are four primitive sentences and two primitive constants,
the symbols for alternation and negation. Lukasiewicz16 accomplished the
same thing with three primitive sentences and two logical constants,
symbols for conditionality and negation. That the incompatibility relation
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alone is sufficient for the same development may be highly significant for
our attempts to analyze nonverbal ~~ought. All of the other_ logic~l
constants convenient for the propos1t10nal calculus can be defmed m
terms of the stroke. An exploration in search of an unverbalized
awareness corresponding to Nicod's one primitive sentence. might be
worth while. (On the other hand, the sentence may be too highly complicated for such a purpose.)
The sentential calculus requires introduction of a predication symbol and
a quantifier. The logical equivalence hypothesis could account for all the
rest. (See Part II, Hypothesis 16.)
While some are finding it difficult to entertain the notion that there may
be nonverbal processes which correspond to all that can be represented in
language, there is another question which may be more pertinent to
human development. What we should be facing is the question of whether
the propositional and sentential calculi of symbolic logic are adequate for
a correspondence to all that goes on in human thought. It may be that
even in symbolic logic we still do not have an instrument rich enough to
represent all that is accomplished in nonverbal thought. The many-valued
logic created by Gotthard Gunther 17, really a place-value system of twovalued components, may soon reveal more about where to search and
what to look for in our inquiry into the nature of intuition.
Conclusion
These considerations of the origin of language and its relationship to
nonverbal thought bring us to a rather startling hypothesis concerning
the nature of language itself. It now appears that language is fundamentally an instrument of expression. Although it is inconceivable
from a practical point of view that language could have developed without
the communication motive, the nature of the instrument does not require
that a second member of the individual inventor's species be involved. The
whole system could emerge from a productive mind expressing itself-or
perhaps I should say, "communicating with itself''.

One who entertains the hypothesis of logically equivalent awarenesses
could point out that the theory developed in this discussion contains much
unnecessary detail. Behavioral counterparts of only four logical constants
would have been sufficient to indicate that an organism can operate on a
nonverbal level in complete accord with the rules of inference by which
one manipulates sentences in a logical derivation. It may be that all
creative intuitive thought is expressible by language regardless of
whether it ever is so expressed by the thinker. If all known language at
the time is inadequate for the purpose at hand, there is still the possibility
that new symbols and even new rules of sentence formation could be
created to fulfill the need. There are still many scholars, especially in the
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humanities and social studies, who find it repugnant to accord as much
importance to thought without words as this article implies. In fact, there
are some who still deny that such thinking takes place at all. Such an
attitide on the part of people who teach, or people who write course
content materials, is a serious curtailment to progress. Until carefully
documented (and tactfully reported!) research brings such scholars face to
face with evidence, education in all fields must continue to suffer. One
great naturalist has remarked that the more man learns about the
mammal kingdom, the more democratic he becomes toward its other
species. This willingness to examine the valuable potentialities which
other species share with man is, perhaps, made easier by the advent of the
space age. As one contemplates the possible existence of strange creatures
residing on other bodies in space, some with language, some without,
some possibly communicating intellectual content by silent projection of
thoughts, then it becomes less uncomfortable to contemplate mental
activity not linked with language. To entertain such thoughts does not
belittle man's most elegant and distinctive feature-the potentially
exquisite tool called 'language'. Furthermore, the more one learns about
our own intricate and complex system of nonverbal expression and
communication, the deeper his understanding of language itself becomes.
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Epilogue
From Unverbalized Awareness
to
Use of a Mother Tongue
It is generally recognized that people operate differently with their
mother tongue from the lack of readiness with which they interpret and
use a language acquired after childhood-all except those fortunate
enough to have grown up in a bilingual or multilingual household. Most of
us have picked up the mother tongue as if it were a natural-even a
causal-relation between a word and its referent. Consider a one-year-old
who has noticed that people who utter the sound, "boy", are referring to a
young male person. From then on, when he hears ''boy", he thinks of a
boy; if he thinks of a boy, he tries to utter ''boy." Similarly, if he .hears
"car", he expects to see an automobile; if he thinks of an automobile, he
utters his version of "car." In the same way, from dozens of occurrences
'boot' and the footwear to which it refers come to be associated: If 'boot',
then a boot or boots; if a boot or boots (in the child's mind), then 'boot.'
Instead of something called 'conditioned reflex,' which would imply an
"and" relation between sound and referent, let us think of a word
operating as an if-and-only-if relation, a biconditional relation between
symbol and referent.
Any biconditional is equivalent to the conjunction of a conditional and
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its converse:

A if and only if B.
is logically equivalent to:
If A then B, and if B then A.
The premise suggested in the preceding paragraph implies the subverbal
equivalent of a deductive inference each time a person interprets 1 a word,
and a subverbal deductive inference in the converse direction each time a
person selects and uses a word. As soon as a child becomes aware of a
word, this word implies referent and referent implies word awareness
becomes a part of him. The awareness itself, acquired by discovery, exists
in a dynamic unverbalized form which "turns on" automatically when the
occasion is appropriate.
But words of the mother tongue acquired before reading age and long
before definitions have been encountered carry with them the entire
complex of noticeable attributes. A fourteen-month-old boy at a window
on an early spring day called, "Boy car-earl Boy car-earl" His mothei-,
investigating, beheld a boy on a bicycle, the first the toddler had ever
seen. A few days later, the same little boy summoned his mother, crying,
"Boy car-car boot! Boy car-car boot!" This time it was a little boy on roller
skates. Obviously, in both cases, 'car-car' referred to an automobile's
property of running on wheels, and the predication in the little observer's
mind was expressed by a juxtaposition of the words. Noticing use of the
copulative verb and other verbs to yield sentence structure comes later
but not much later-only a few weeks in the case of the little boy in our
example.
Even more impressive than babies becoming aware of referents for
sounds is evidence that small children discover and apply abstract
grammatical rules grasped in the form of unverbalized awareness. The
little girl who relates, "Yesterday we go-ed to Grandma's," has never
heard the metalinguistic rule about what to do to a verb to express past
tense. But she has discovered the rule and applied it to an irregular verb,
not by imitation-she had not heard anyone else say "go-ed"- but by
deduction derived from the unverbalized rule.
Another still more subtle example comes from the four-year-old girl
who brought to her father a square rod stuck in a round hole; she
requested him to take apart the two pieces of the toy.
Father: "How did you get it fastened in there like that?"
Child: "I hammed it in."
Father: "You what?"
Child: "I hammed it in."
Father: "Uh, how---?"
Child: ''With a hammer of course!"
Certainly the little girl had never heard a statement of the wordformation rule which she was using; nor did she possess the necessary
vocabulary for "saying it to herself." She had become aware of the
generalization from having heard such pairs of words as 'swim', 'swim82Epilogue

•
' ; 'cut' , 'cutt er ' , etc .
mer'· 'play ' , 'player ' ; ·tr·rm' , 't rrmmer
Th~ spontaneity with which one applies generalizations held on an
unverbalized-awareness level explains why the mother tongue can be used
80 effectiviely to manipulate people. We have seen that a word one
acquires by hearing it used in the presence of a referent may, for that
person refer to a whole complex of attributes. The whole thing "turns on"
when the person hears or reads the word. This loaded-word phenomenon
in propaganda and advertising is not confusion of a symbol with its
referent. That confusion, emphasized by the Warsaw Circle of scientists
and philosophers, is quite a different matter. For instance, many people
think numerals are numbers instead of names of numbers. A language
adequate for expressing scientific thought, checking thought for fallacy,
roakingpredictions-such a language must keep the distinction between
object language and metalanguage clear. Mixing the two in a computer
program, so they tell us, can lead to disaster.
Two new rules for sentence formation have emerged during the last
century to resolve crises in foundations of language. The first was Bertrand Russell's resolution of paradoxes: No sentence shall assert or imply
that a class is a member of itself. The second, contributed by the Warsaw
logicians to resolve difficulties presented by antinomies, translates to:
" ... the rules of English grammar require that no sentence literally
contain the objects to which the expressions in the sentences may ref er,
but only the names of such objects. ''2
A brilliant young cyberneticist, pleading for consideration of relations
only, was on the verge of mental illness, turning his mind to mush by
tussling with the utterance:
"Let's stamp out nouns!"
The fellow was impervious to another's remonstrance,
"But 'noun' is a noun!"
The author of the utterance simply couldn't think anymore. As Rudolf
Carnap has said, "We simply must not put words together in that way."
The Polish work was actually pre-dated several years by an American
mathematics teacher turned teacher-of-English.3 Miss Gowdy did not use
the modern convenience of single quotation marks to construct names of
symbols. She used italics. Orally, she had to say,
"The word, Mary, is the subject of the sentence, Mary is happy. Not the
girl, Mary."
Miss Gowdy taught for awhile at Eastern Illinois State Normal School,
and left an indelible mark on a long-to-be distinguished Department of
English. Her textbook, English Grammar, was used at Eastern until 1934,
when the worn textbook library copies had to be replaced by something
not out of print.
So! Although avoiding confusion of symbol with referent, avoiding
confusing the name with the concept, avoiding mixing object language
with metalanguage-although all this is crucial to correct language, it has
nothing to do with the loaded-word phenomenon. The person responding
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automatically to words loaded with unadmitted attributes of the thing
supposed to be mentioned-such a person is vulnerable to a very different
kind of danger. He must be confronted with counter examples to his
unverbalized false impressions. If he has to struggle through "all by
himself', he must try to verbalize his until-then unstated beliefs, and
initiate his own search for counter example and inconsistency. As I have
said elsewhere, I believe that the power of detachment achievable through
linguistic formulation is on a par with communication in the contributions of language to human progress.
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Miss Hendrix was Teacher Coordinator of the UICSM Math
Project from 1956-1966. She al o erved as Content Director of
the UICSM Film Project and Principal Investigator, UICSM
Psychobiological Study. Prior to her UI appointment, she wa on
the mathematics staff at Ea tern lllinoi Univer ity from 19301956. She was on leave from Eastern between 1956-1962 to work
on the UICSM Math Project. She ha been involved in the work of
Foundations of Mathematics, Theory of Signs, Theory of
Leaming, Theory of Instruction, and Nature of Language. At the
Univer ity of Chicago, she studied the e subject for two summers
and an academic year as a tudent-at-large by pecial pennis ion
of her professor .
Mi Hendrix has held numerous po itions and member hips in
state, regional, and national mathematic and science ocieties. A
Phi Beta Kappa, he earned the A.B. degree DePauw University;
M.S. Education, Univer ity of Illinois; and M.A. Mathematics,
Univer ity of Illinois. Her primary area of re earch has been
Nature of Unverbalized Awareness.
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